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An Unconventional Approach to Reviewing the Judicially
Unreviewable: Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause
to Copyright
Donald P. Harris'
"[B]y virtually ignoring the central purpose of the
Copyright/Patent Clause . . . the Court has quitclaimed to
Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly
read, the Court has stated that Congress' actions under the
Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes,
judicially unreviewable." 2
INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 2014, the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Internet, held one of a number of hearings reviewing
the Copyright Act.3 This particular hearing focused, among other things, on the
copyright term (the length over which copyrights are protected).4 While it is not
surprising that Congress is again considering the appropriate term for copyrights-
Congress has reviewed and increased the copyright term many times since the first
Copyright Act of 1791 5-it is troubling because Congress has unfettered discretion
in doing so. To be sure, the Constitution squarely places this responsibility in
Congress's hands.6 But Congress's renewed consideration of the copyright term
should trouble those who believe the copyright term is already excessive and
1 Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I am grateful for valuable comments on
earlier drafts from Craig Green, Gregory Mandel, Mark Rahdert, and Rachel Rebouche, and also for
feedback from John Whelan and the participants of the George Washington University Law School
Speaker Series (March 12, 2015). I also thank Lauren Green for her outstanding research assistance. All
mistakes, of course, are mine.
2 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,242 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 See Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term: Hearing Bqfore the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2
(2014).
4 Id. at 2. The hearing also included discussions about moral rights, termination tights, and resale
royalties. Id. Witnesses at the hearing included: Rick Carnes, President of the Songwriters Guild of
America; Professor Michael W. Carroll, Director of the American University Washington College of
Law Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property;, Karyn A. Temple Claggett, Associate
Register of Copyrights and Director of Policy and International Affairs for the U.S. Copyright Office;
Thomas D. Sydnor II, Visiting Scholar at the Center for Internet, Communications and Technology
Policy at the American Enterprise Institute; and Casey Rae, Vice President for Policy and Education at
Future of Music Coalition. Id. at Ill.
'See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 1, COPYRIGHT BASICS 6 (May2012).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
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unwarranted. Congress has never reduced the copyright term, and there are scant
signs that it is willing to do so now.
The concern is not whether Congress will act. Over the last four decades
Congress has aggressively expanded copyright protection and is likely to continue
doing so.7 The concern is that there is currently no way to predict whether such
future congressional action will or will not comply with the Constitution. The
problem stems from the murky constitutional law in this area. Congress has almost
unfettered discretion to pass copyright legislation, and this discretion is fueled by
the astonishing lack of guidance from the Supreme Court.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has twice confronted copyright legislation
with opportunities to provide darity to the constitutionality of congressional action
with respect to copyright term extension and expansion.' Despite these occasions to
provide such clarity, the Court has failed to do so, abdicating its pivotal role in
interpreting the Constitution thereby setting constitutional boundaries for the
Constitution's Copyright Clause.
The Copyright Clause has limits. The Clause protects literary and artistic
works only for "limited Times" and only to "promote the Progress of Science."9 In
the Court's two controversial copyright decisions, Eldred v. Asbcrofl° and Golan v.
Holder,1 the Court had opportunities to shed light on "a virgin area of
constitutional theory," that is the scope and reach of Congress's power under the
Copyright Clause.' 2 The Court has found it exceedingly difficult to do so. Perhaps
more disturbingly, the Court's latest decisions in Eldred and Golan continue to
sustain the Court's extreme deference to congressional action and leaves one to
question whether the Copyright Clause places any limits on Congress's powers to
legislate in this area.
Prior to the acts at issue in Eldred and Golan, Congress had expanded the reach
of the Copyright Clause, steadily increasing copyright protection. 3 These
expansions responded to changes in technology, pressure from interested industry
groups, and international concerns.14 While these forces necessitate a change in the
scope of protection, it is not altogether dear that the change in scope inexorably
leans in the direction of expanding rights. But, even when Congress exceeded what
were previously believed to be its limits, Congress had been careful to steer dear of
' See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Star. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
s See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
'o Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192.
n Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
52 See Malla Pollack, Dealing with 'Old Father William," or Moving from Constitutional Text to
Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 337, 341 (2002). In both decisions, in particular, the Court reviewed limits the Constitution
prescribes as to term limits. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
" See infra Part I.B.
14 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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one area when increasing terms-the public domain (the space that expired or
unprotected works occupy). Congress had steered dear, that is, until its latest foray
into the copyright realm, when yet another perceived limit fell.
Eldred and Golan affected the copyright term and the public domain in slightly
different ways. Before the legislation at issue in Eldred, the copyright term was life
of the author plus an additional fifty years.' 5 In Eldred, the Court reviewed the
Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which extended protection to existing
works ready to expire for an additional twenty years, 16 thus preventing works that
would have entered the public domain from doing so. In Golan, the Court reviewed
the Berne Convention Implementation Act, Section 104A of the Copyright Act,
which grants foreign copyright owners the right to have certain works "restored,"
renewing protection for the works' remaining life. 7 Section 104A went further
than the CTEA because it authorized works that had already fallen into the public
domain to be wrenched from the public domain and protected anew.
18
The Eldred Court held that Congress did not exceed its constitutional authority
in enacting the CTEA.1 9 The CTEA did not violate the Copyright Clause's
"limited Times" prescription because the new term of life plus seventy years was
limited, i.e., "confined within certain bounds," "restrained," or "circumscribed."
20
The CTEA did not run afoul of the "promote Progress" Clause because Congress
could rationally believe that protecting American authors abroad and placing
existing copyright holders in parity with future copyright holders would "promote
the Progress of Science" by providing additional incentives for authors to create.
21
Along the same lines, the Golan Court held that the "limited Times" and
"promote Progress" restrictions did not limit Congress's power to enact copyright
laws, even when those laws removed works from the public domain.22 As the term
in Eldred did not violate the "limited Times" prescription, neither did the term in
Golan, which, at most, provided for a similar term after the work was restored.
23
And because the Act created incentives to disseminate works, Congress could
rationally believe that it would "promote the Progress of Science," and the Court
concluded that "[t]he public domain . . . [is] not a threshold that Congress [is]
powerless to traverse."24
" Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Star. 2541, 2572 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)).16 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
17 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877-78.
Is Id. at 878.
19 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
20 Id. at 198-99.
21 See id. at 206, 213-15.
22 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884.
23 See id. at 882.
24 Id. at 883, 889 (citing Golan v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007)). The Court also
discussed the constitutionality of the Restoration Act under First Amendment grounds. Id. at 889.
While the Act was petitioned as a content-neutral regulation of speech failing to meet strict scrutiny,
the Court relied on its rejection of the similar argument made in Eldred, claiming the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 violated free speech. See id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Golan, 132 S.
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These cases are troubling not because the Acts are necessarily
unconstitutional---although there are strong arguments they are-but because the
Court failed to articulate any principle that might guide future congressional action
in the copyright arena, 25 such as those actions Congress is currently contemplating.
The Court's logic shows no signs of indicating a limit as even more aggressive
congressional action is upheld, and upheld summarily. In combination, these cases
suggest that the Copyright Clause places no meaningfil limits on congressional
ability to legislate in the copyright field, and that the Court will not second-guess
Congress's actions. In Eldred, for example, the Court stated that it would not
question Congress's judgments in the copyright field "however debatable or
arguably unwise they may be."26 In Golan, too, the Court remarked that the
"judgment [Section 104A] expresses lies well within the ken of the political
branches,"2 7 and "[gliven the authority we hold Congress has, we will not second-
guess the political choice Congress made between leaving the public domain
untouched and embracing [the] Berne [Convention] unstintingly."2 These
holdings are remarkable both for the deference the Court afforded Congress (a
deference not seen in the Court's treatment of Congress's other enumerated Article
I powers) and for their potential breadth. While deference in such policy matters is
appropriate, such deference cannot "become abdication in matters of law."29 The
Copyright Clause has limits. Moreover, in both decisions, the Court relied on
congressional judgments that do not hold up under careful scrutiny.
Aside from concerns over Eldred and Golan separately, more serious concerns
arise when these cases are considered together. The Court insists, as it must, that in
fact the Constitution does place limits on congressional action. The constitutional
text could not be clearer on this point.30 And the Court promises that there is a
limit.3 1 Yet, the Court has given no indication what those limits might be, nor any
doctrinal framework that one could someday use to draw a line.32
Ct. 873 (No. 10-545). In accordance with Eldred, the Court rejects the Restoration Act as a free speech
transgression and denies heightened scrutiny by reasoning that "some restriction on expression is the
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright" and that the Restoration Act has not altered
the "traditional contours" of copyright protection, which include the built-in First Amendment
protections of "idea/expression dichotomy" and "fair use" defense. Golan, 132 S. Ct at 889-91. As this
Article is focused on the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment issue is beyond the scope of these
additional discussions.
' The Court's holding in both Eldred and Golan that the CTEA and The Berne Retroactivity Act
comport with Congress's legislative objectives and satisfied rather than violated the Constitution's
Copyright Clause can be justified on a number of grounds. But that misses the point. The Court did not
support its holding with persuasive evidence and, more importantly, did not provide any guidance for
future Courts or Congress.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
27 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 894.
2s Id. at 887.
' Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
30 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199.32The combination of Eldred and Golan leaves perhaps only one remaining limit on congressional
authority-the prohibition against perpetual copyright protection. Even here, however, the Court's
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After reviewing both Eldred and Golan, this Article suggests that the Court has,
as Justice Stevens feared, made congressional decisions under the Copyright Clause
"judicially unreviewable."33 This Article heeds the Court's (and the Constitution's)
promise that there is, and must be, a limit on congressional power in this field.
This Article also takes seriously the Court's decisions that established doctrines
concerning Congress's Section 5 power (congruence and proportionality) and First
Amendment heightened scrutiny analysis must be rejected as acceptable standards.
At the same time, this Article questions whether the Court's adoption of rational
basis scrutiny is acceptable, concluding that the Court's recent decisions have
shown that rational basis scrutiny cannot possibly do the job.
As such, this Article offers a different doctrinal framework in which to analyze
copyright legislation. The Article suggests the Court look to the dormant
Commerce Clause as an analogous analytical framework- Under that framework,
the Court would look to see whether the legislation discriminates on its face, which
would then require a strict scrutiny test. Strict scrutiny would likely apply to only a
very narrow band of congressional action. If the legislation were applied
evenhandedly, the Court would engage in a balancing test to determine if the
legislation's benefits to copyright owners outweigh the harms to the public at large.
This test would apply to a wider range of congressional action. While the doctrine
is intended to prevent state burdens on interstate commerce, the doctrine is
appropriate in circumstances where the state legislation discriminates against out-
of-state interests who have no political voice in the particular state, and the
legislation regulates more than mere economic conduct. These differences
appropriately call for a test that receives more than the scant, surface mode of
review accorded economic regulation. These differences are also what make the
doctrine appropriate for copyright review.
This is more than a call for a different outcome in either or both Eldred and
Golan. Rather, it is a call to delineate more precisely copyright's reach, and to
provide a balancing analysis that is already inherent in copyright but that has been
woefily absent from the Court's recent copyright cases. While this approach may
seem novel, or even radical, the predictability of new congressional action,
combined with the Court's current set of doctrinal dead ends, requires something
different. The many functional comparisons between copyright and the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrines suggest that this framework might be just what the
Court, and our society, need most.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth foundational principles of
copyright law and highlights the limits imposed by the Copyright Clause. Parts II
decisions leave ample room for Congress to, in effect, create the perpetual copyright that stands as the
last remaining limit on Congress's power. A broad reading of Golan, for example, suggests that
Congress can constitutionally withdraw works from the public domain, regardless of the reason the
works fell into the public domain, including that the original copyright term expired. See Golan, 132 S.
Ct. at 884-86. And Congress may do so only to satisfy "international concerns," whatever they may be.
See id. at 894; see also infra Part II.
3 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and III discuss Eldred and Golan and demonstrate in detail why neither of these
decisions provide a satisfactory framework in which to evaluate congressional action
with respect to copyright. Indeed, these Parts explain how the Court
inappropriately abdicated its responsibility to place limits on Congress's power
under the Copyright Clause. Part IV introduces a new framework to guide future
congressional action in the copyright field. That framework relies on the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The section identifies the parallels
between copyright and the dormant Commerce Clause that support use of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Two of the major principles are the doctrine's
recognition that more is at issue than mere economic regulation and that the
doctrine acts as a response to legislation that effectively bypasses the democratic
process. Part IV applies this new framework to the acts at issue in both Eldred and
Golan. The Article then offers responses to possible criticisms, and then concludes.
I. PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Copyright Clause and the Utilitarian Theory of Copyright
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
copyrights and patents through the IP Clause (also referred to as the Copyright
and Patent Clause).3 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."" Embedded in the IP Clause are two grants of power,
one to establish patents, and the other to establish copyrights. The copyright grant
reads: "Congress shall have the Power ... [to promote the Progress of Science...
by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . .
Writings."3 6 This Clause empowers Congress to pass copyright legislation, justified
on utilitarian grounds.37 In other words, copyright law has utility by providing
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Of Congress's constitutional powers, this Clause is unique in that it
alone specifies the means by which Congress can exercise its authority: "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science." Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. The Patent Clause reads: "Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science ... by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective.
Discoveries." Id.
31 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property's Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (2013) (discussing the utilitarian approach to intellectual property
law). The utilitarian-based theory of copyright stands in contrast to the natural rights theory
predominantly advanced in Europe. Under the natural rights theory, a person who creates the original
work of expression, by virtue of creating it, merits rights in and to that work. See Russell K. Hasan,
Winning the Copyright War: Copyright's Merger Doctrine and Natural Rights Theory as Solutions to the
Problem of Reconciling Copyright and Free Speech, 14 FEDERALIST SOCY FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD.,
Feb. 28, 2013, at 59, 66, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/winning-the-copyright-war-
copyrights-merger-doctrine-and-natural-rights-theory-as-solutions-to-the-problem-of-reconciling-
copyright-and-free-speech. Any other person must ask the creator's permission to use the work Id. It is
[Vol. 104
UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO REVIEWING
incentives for artists to create, promoting creativity to benefit the public by
allowing access to authors' creative contributions.38 Congress does this by, among
other things, protecting authors' works but limiting the term of protection for these
works. The Clause's primacy purpose, thus, is not to reward the labor of authors or
to provide authors "special private benefit," 39 but to ensure the public benefits from
a copyright regime that produces a wide variety of creative works for public
consumption4
°
B. The Copyright Clause's Limitations
The Copyright Clause contains a number of limitations on Congress's authority
to legislate. 41 These limits help copyright law strike the complex balance between
protecting the owner's interests in expression and the public's interest in access to
creative works. First, Congress may only grant "Authors" exclusive rights. 42 Second,
Congress may do so only for authors' "Writings," and only for "limited Times."4
3
Finally, copyright laws must fulfill an express purpose: to "promote the Progress of
Science." 4
4
While Congress initially applied these limitations narrowly, over the last four
decades Congress has expansively applied and significantly expanded each of these
limitations.45 For example, initial copyright statutes protected maps and books. 46
Later, protection extended to photographs, musical and dramatic works, motion
pictures, sculpture, and architectural works. 47 Now, copyright protects authors'
the author's labor and effort that gives rise to ownership. Id.; see Craig A. Stern & Gregory M. Jones,
The Coherence ofNaturalInalienable Rights, 76 UMKC L. REv. 939, 971-72 (2008).
" Rosenblatt, supra note 37, at 453.
'9 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
' See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1991); Sony Corp. of.Am.,
464 U.S. at 428-33; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Of course, as the Eldred Court correctly
points out, "[t]he two ends are not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing
individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42 id.
43 Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the terms "authors" and "writings" imply a
requirement of originality. Feist, 499 U.S. at 351, 355. '"The sine qua non of copyright is originality." Id.
at 345. Works cannot gain copyright protection unless they are "original works of authorship." Id. at
355. The Court has also held that "fixation" is a requirement, ostensibly flowing from the "writings"
limitation. Id.
44 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
45 In turn, statutes protecting the rights of creators were similarly narrowly construed. See, e.g.,
Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 551, 565-66 (2007)
("Under previous copyright statutes, an author's exclusive rights were, for the most part, narrowly
tailored and narrowly construed; moreover, acts that did not fall within the contemplated scope of those
exclusive rights were considered to be unregulated and consequently free from copyright constraints.").
' Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802, 1819, 1831, 1834).
4' Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012) (listing when copyright protection was extended to
dramatic works (1856), photographs (1865), motion pictures (1912), and architectural works (1990));
Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (extending copyright protection to musical
2015-2016]
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"original works of authorship."48 This is relatively uncontroversial as it
demonstrates copyright's ability to adapt to changing times and new technologies.
Congress has similarly expanded who may qualify as an "Author." While the
term might have been construed to be limited to flesh and blood authors and
people who actually created the literary or artistic work, "Authors" now clearly not
only comprise corporations, but also through the work made for hire doctrine,
allows for employers to be "Authors" for the works of their creative employees.4 9
Further complicating matters, Congress has passed copyright legislation under
its other constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause, circumventing the
Copyright Clause's express limitations.50
compositions); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (extending copyright protection to
sculptures).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). A work made for hire is a work that is created in the context of
employment, in which the employer owns all the rights, not the employee. See id. Commissioned works
are also works made for hire if the work falls into one of nine categories: "[(1)]as a contribution to a
collective work, [(2)]as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, [(3)]as a translation, [(4)]as
a supplementary work, [(5)]as a compilation, [(6)] as an instructional text, [(7)] as a test, [(8)] as answer
material for a test, or [(9)] as an atlas." Id.
50 In United States v. Moghadam, for example, the court held that an anti-bootlegging statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2319A, could be enacted via Commerce Clause powers despite lack of compliance with the
Copyright Clause. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Section
2319A made it illegal to record and distribute live performances, thus making copyright protection
inherent in works that were not "fixed" for the purposes of eligibility under the Copyright Act. See 17
U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (requiring that works be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" in order to
be eligible for inherent copyright protection). While the court did not decide whether § 2319A satisfied
the fixation requirements of the Copyright Clause, it found the legislation constitutional as a valid
exercise of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274, 1282. Fmding that the
inherently commercial nature of bootlegging would inevitably affect interstate commerce, the court was
able to validate § 2319A via the "'substantial effects' test of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." Id. at 1282. The question remained, however: could the court circumvent the Copyright
Clause to apply the Commerce Clause? The court addressed this "tension" between competing
constitutional provisions, ultimately finding that "in some circumstances," including this one, "the
Commerce Clause indeed may be used to accomplish that which may not have been permissible under
the Copyright Clause." Id. at 1280. The court reasoned that because the wording of the Copyright
Clause is "stated in positive terms," and thus does not "imply any negative pregnant" the Framers did
not intend for its provisions to prohibit legislation via other constitutional provisions. See id.
The Mogbadam holding was reinforced recently in United States v. Martignon, in which § 2319A
was again challenged: this time for its lack of compliance with the "limited Times" provision of the
Copyright Clause. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 141-44 (2d Cir. 2007). Though "limited
Times" was mentioned in Moghadam, the court did not address it at that time. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1275 n.9. Again, the Martignon court addressed whether Congress could bypass the Copyright Clause
via the Commerce Clause. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 141. Though the court arrived at the same result as
in Moghadam, it acknowledged that at least in some instances Congress might not make an end run
around the Copyright Clause: "when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted Congress
by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the Copyright
Clause." See id. at 149. The court found that because § 2319A is largely a criminal statute, and thus
beyond the scope of the Copyright Clause's civil judicial power, it did not meet the first requirement of
the test and thus Congress could rely on the Commerce Clause. See id. at 151-53.
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Most relevant here, Congress has expanded the copyright term far beyond its
original term. The original copyright term was set at fourteen years."1 The term has
steadily increased from the initial fourteen years, with a possible fourteen year
renewal (1790),52 to twenty-eight years, with a potential fourteen year renewal
(1831),53 to twenty-eight years with a potential twenty-eight year renewal (1909), 4
to life of the author plus fifty years (1976), 55 to its current term of life of the author
plus an additional seventy years (1998).56 This increase in term stands in stark
contrast to the patent term, also governed by the IP Clause's "limited Times,"
which began with a similar fourteen-year term57 and has been lengthened to its
current twenty-year term.
58
The concept of "limited Times" is foundational to copyright law because it
helps define and protect the public domain. Thus, Congress's expansion of the
Copyright Clause's "limited Times" is not without consequences-it concomitantly
reduces the public domain.
C. Whither the Public Domain?
The public domain is a critical, indispensable feature of the copyright regime.
However, there is little consensus on what the public domain entails, and a
universally accepted definition has proven elusive. Professor Ochoa contends that
there are at least thirteen possible definitions of the public domain. 9 The most
s" Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
52 id.
5" Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2,4 Stat. at 436-37.
54 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
15 Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 3, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012)).
56 17 U.S.C. § 302.
57 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10.
58 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).5
' Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings ofthe Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REv. 215, 217-21
(2002) [hereinafter Ochoa, Origins] (listing the possible definitions as (1) "inventions and works that
were formerly subject to patent and copyright protection, but are no longer"; (2) ideas contained in
copyrighted materials and artistic works contained in patented material; (3) "statutes [and] judicial
opinions"; (4) "basic scientific principles"; (5) "all inventions that are obvious, not novel, or not useful";
(6) "facts"; (7) "clichds, unoriginal material, and indispensable expressions"; (8) "all ideas and works for
which the proper [patent or copyright law] formalities are not followed"; (9) "[w]ords, phrases, images,
and product designs that are generic or that become generic"; (10) "words, phrases, images, and product
designs that are functional (and not otherwise protected by copyright or patent)"; (11) "a [trade]mark
which ceases to be used"; (12) trade secrets that become generally known; and (13) "the name or likeness
of a person who has been dead for a long time."); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY
L.J. 965, 975-977 (1990) (explaining that the public domain is "compris[ed] [of] elements of
intellectual property that are ineligible for private ownership" and the public domain "contains works
[that are] free from copyright" including "[w]orks created before the enactment of copyright statutes,"
"works once subject to copyright, but created so long ago that the copyright has since expired," and
works that "were ineligible for U.S. copyright or failed to comply with a formal prerequisite for securing
it."); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 789-811 (2006)
(offering thirteen definitions of public domain including: (1) "information artifacts unencumbered by
2015-2016]
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widely accepted definition, and the one used throughout this Article, is the one
that Ochoa dominantly advances: a "body of literary and artistic works (or other
information) that is not subject to any copyright (or other intellectual property
right), and which therefore may be freely used by any member of the general
public."6° So described, once a work enters the public domain, such as for failure to
comply with copyright formalities or expiration of the copyright term, society
benefits through free and unrestricted access to the work. The more works that
enter the public domain, the more vibrant and diverse it is and in turn, the more
the scheme facilitates public use of creative outputs to participate in the process of
cultural development. Artistic creation does not occur in a vacuum. Creative
activity regularly involves the production of works that depend upon or are derived
from previous works; works in the public domain are the lifeblood of further
creative material.
Scholars have complained that over the past three decades the public domain
has been "under attack."61 They bemoan congressional legislation as evincing "a
systematic imbalance in favor of the expansion and deepening of exclusive rights to
information at the expense of the public domain," and resulting in a vanishing
public domain.62 To make the matter more concrete, no copyrighted work that has
been created in the past eighty years has entered the public domain. 63 Nor will any
enter until 2019.'4 The primary source of this systemic imbalance is legislation
increasing the copyright term. 65
intellectual property rights"; (2) "IP-free information resources"; (3) "the constitutionally protected
public domain"; (4) "[p]rivatizable [i]nformation [r]esources"; (5) "[b]roadly [u]sable [i]nformation
[rlesources"; (6) "contractually constructed information commons"; (7) "[a] [s]tatus [c]onferring a
[p]resumptive [night of [c]reative [a]ppropriation"; (8) a "cultural landscape"; (9) "a communicative
sphere"; (10) "publication of... governmental information"; (11) "[a] [d]omain of [p]ublicly [a]ccessible
[i]nformation"; (12) "[t]he [u]npublished [p]ublic [d]omain"; and (13) the "romantic public domain.").
o Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan v. Holder,
VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 123, 124 (2011); see also Ochoa, Origins, supra note 59, at 259.
61 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction ofthe Public Domain, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 38, 39; see also JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 46 (2008) (ebook); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 196-97; Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the
DigitalAge, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1092-93 (1998).
6 Benkler, supra note 61, at 196. Benkler claims this is so because 'the benefits of such rights are
clearly seen by, and expressed by, well-defined interest holders that exist at the time the legislation is
passed" and 'in contrast, most of the social costs-which are economic, social, political, and moral---are
diffuse and likely to be experienced in the future by parties not yet aware of the fact that they will be
affected by the extension of rights." Id. Benkler is describing the immense lobbying of the content
industry, as revealed in scholarship by Jessica Litman. See id. at 196-97; e.g., JESSICA D. LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 202 (2006) (ebook).
6 See Eldred v. Ashroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2012); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, §§ 102-03, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
65 See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power to Promote the Progress ofScience: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36
LOY. LA. L. Rv. 1, 74 (2002) ("No one can reliably plan to prepare derivative works so long as
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Copyright legislation, including an increased copyright term, is a response to
three separate pressures: (1) technological innovation;66 (2) interest group political
pressure;67 and (3) international obligations. 68 Each of these pressures played a role
in the Court's decisions in Eldred and Golan. However, it is this final pressure,
international obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works ("Berne" or "Berne Convention") and the Agreement on the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), that Congress
most heavily relied upon and the Court most readily accepted in justifying the
legislation at issue in both Eldred and Golan.
I. THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
A. Eldred v. Asbcroft: The Court's First Failed Effort
In Eldred, petitioners were individuals and businesses whose products or
services built on copyrighted works that had fallen into the public domain. 69 They
claimed that the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which extended the
copyright term by twenty years (increasing the term from life of the author plus
fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years), violated the Copyright Clause's
"limited Times" and "promote Progress" limitations.
70
Congress enacted the CTEA in response to the European Union's increase of
EU copyright term through the 1993 European Copyright Term Directive; this
expanded copyright protection by twenty years for European Union members.7"
The EU Copyright Term Directive provided reciprocal treatment for nationals of
those countries that provided extended protection for EU members. 72 Congress
enacted the CTEA to ensure that U.S. authors would benefit from increased
copyright protection in the EU.73
In responding to petitioners' arguments, the Court made dear early in the
opinion that petitioners had an uphill battle, foreshadowing its holding by noting
Congress might extend the term of copyright. To the extent that the incentive for authors is significant,
the disincentive for users of the public domain is also significant.").
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was enacted in
part due to technological innovations. See S. REP. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
67 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Star. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted in part due to interest group pressure.
See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 62, at 36.
61 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act was enacted in part due to international pressures. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-08
(2003).
69 Id. at 196.701d.
71 See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 4 (1996).
72 See id. at 4-5.
7' See id. at 3.
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that "[t]he CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain."74
1. The "Limited Times" Analysis-The Eldred petitioners argued that "[t]he
"'limited Time' in effect when a copyright is secured" (i.e., life plus fifty years)
"becomes the constitutional boundary, a dear line beyond the power of Congress to
extend."75 "[A] time prescription, once set," they argued, "becomes forever 'fixed' or
'inalterable." 76 Accordingly, even though Congress might increase the term for
future works, Congress could not extend existing copyrights. 77 The Court rejected
this argument.
78
Relying on text, history, and precedent, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, held that rather than "inalterable" or "fixed," the term "limited" means
"'confined within certain bounds,' 'restrained,' or 'circumscribed'." 79 Looking only
to the new term-life of the author plus seventy years-the Court held that this
term was "limited," or confined within certain bounds.8 ' The Court also found "an
unbroken congressional practice" of granting authors of existing copyrighted works
the same benefit of new term extensions, thus allowing all copyright owners to "be
governed evenhandedly under the same regime."S Finally, the Court held that in
deciding whether the CTEA was a "rational exercise of legislative authority" under
the Copyright Clause it would "defer substantially to Congress."8 2 The
"international concerns," that is, reciprocity under the 1993 European Copyright
Term Directive, provided that rationality.8 3
The Eldred petitioners mounted another attack against the "limited Times"
prescription by claiming that Congress created perpetual copyrights by continually
extending protection to existing works before they expired.84 Once again, the Court
rejected petitioners' argument.8 5 The Court remarked that "[n]othing before th[e]
Court warrant[ed] construction of the CTEA's 20-year term extension as a
congressional attempt to evade or override the 'limited Times' constraint."8 6
The Court's decision expressed some concern, however. The Court stated that
it was "not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be."87 Yet, as
74 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205.
75 Id. at 193.76 Id. at 199.
77 See id.7 1 Id. at 199-200.
79 Id. at 199.
'0 See id. at 199-200.
" Id. at 200.
12 Id. at 204.
83 Id. at 204-06. The Directive is aimed at European countries as an effort to ensure uniformity
throughout Europe. Council Directive 93/98/EEC of Oct. 29, 1993, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 9 (EC).
14 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
8 Id.
6Id. at 209.
" Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
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argued below, the Court must still articulate constitutional boundaries of
congressional power under the Copyright Clause.
2. The "Promoting the Progress of Science" Analysis-As to the Copyright Clause's
"promote Progress" limit, petitioners argued that this "preambular language
identifie[d] the sole end to which Congress may legislate,"88 and thus all copyright
legislation must "promote the Progress of Science."89 This requires that copyright
legislation provide incentives for authors to create new works. Because the CTEA
failed to stimulate the creation of any new works, the CTEA did not-and could
not--"promote Progress."9
The Court agreed that the "primary objective of copyright' system is 'to
promote the Progress of Science'" but pronounced that individual acts need not
"promote Progress" so long as Congress creates a copyright system that does so. 91
The Court stressed 'that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how
best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives"9 2 and again relying on
congressional discretion, international obligations in complying with the EU
Copyright Term Directive, "demographic, economic, and technological changes,"9
3
and Congress's consistent practice of applying adjustments of the copyright term to
both future and existing works, found that such factors "overwhem[ed]"
petitioners' argument that the CTEA "fail[ed] . . . to 'promote the Progress of
Science.'"9
4
In ruling on both the "limited Times" and "promote Progress" arguments, the
Court was carefid to steer dear of removing works from the public domain,
underscoring that the CTEA did not remove works from the public domain and
observing that the important parity achieved involved "future works and existing
works notyet in thepublic domain."95 Moreover, though granting exclusive rights to
authors may encourage individual creativity, the Court made dear that copyright
8 1 Id. at 211.
19 See id. at 211-12.
9 Id.
91 See id. at 212.
92 !d,
9' Id. at 205-08. The Court explained that "[m]embers of Congress expressed the view that, as a
result of increases in human longevity and in parents' average age when their children are born, the pre-
CTEA term did not adequately secure 'the right to profit from licensing one's work during one's
lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that one's children-and perhaps their children-
might also benefit from one's posthumous popularity.'" Id. at 207 n.14.
9, Id. at 213-14; see also id. at 215 ("Congress could rationally seek to 'promote . .. Progress' by
including in every copyright statute an express guarantee that authors would receive the benefit of any
later legislative extension of the copyright term.").
9' See id. at 213 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the CTEA allowed ample room for
future derivations of ideas or facts and did not allow copyright holders to gain a "monopoly on ...
knowledge." See id. at 217.
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has historically been more concerned with ensuring that protected works someday
end up in the public domain.
96
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the practical effect of the CTEA's
copyright term extension was to create a framework that is "virtually perpetual,"
unconstitutionally violating the "limited Times" provision.97 He also argued that
the CTEA inhibited any creative progress by limiting the works that would
otherwise be available in the public domain. 9 And the CTEA did not increase the
author's private benefit, instead, it would serve to positively impact only the author's
heirs-going beyond the Copyright Clause's stated intent of "'securing for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 9"
Breyer also argued that by protecting works that would otherwise be in the
public domain, the extended copyright term for existing works wholly failed to
"promote Progress." 1°° Breyer argued authors who wish to create from works
already in the public domain need not seek the original author's permission, thus
avoiding costs that could potentially inhibit or even prohibit their creative goals.'
By protecting works that would otherwise be publicly accessible, the CTEA would
place undue obstacles in the way of potential authors' progress. 0 2
To support his argument that the CTEA failed to "promote Progress," Breyer
relied on an economic analysis provided by leading economists, including five
Nobel Prize winning economists.10 3  These economists concluded that the
motivational incentives created by the statute could not justify the extension.' °4
Monetary incentives fifty-five or seventy-five years after the author's death tend to
diminish, if not disappear completely.105 Even if, in the rare instance, an author
were "moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a
century hence," 1" this scant positive effect would hardly outweigh the harm caused
by removing the works from the public domain. 7 In responding to the majority's
contention that an additional twenty years could provide incentives, Breyer
96 Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he requirement that those exclusive grants be for 'limited
Times' serves the ultimate purpose of promoting the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' by
guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity
expires."). The Court also noted that both the First Amendment and fair use doctrine promoted
creativity beyond the scope of copyright protection. See id. at 219-20 (majority opinion).
97 Id. at 242-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 See id. at 243 ('The economic effect of this 20-year extension-the longest blanket extension
since the Nation's founding-is to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual.").
"9 See id. at 242-43 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).
'oo See id. at 247, 249-50.
'0' See id. at 249-50.
102 See id. at 250.
'o
3 Id. at 254-55.
o Id. at 254-55, 257; see also EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144E,
COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 4-5 (1998).
105 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 255.
7 Id. at 257. Breyer also questioned if, as the majority found, an additional 20 years could provide
incentives, why not go further and provide protection beyond the author's life plus 70 years, such as for
"two centuries, five centuries, [or] 1,000 years." Id. at 255.
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intimated that a more searching inquiry was needed, observing that if an additional
twenty years could provide incentives, why not extend the term for "two centuries,
five centuries, [or] 1,000 years."" ° As Breyer explained, "[F]rom a rational
economic perspective the time difference among these periods makes no real
difference,"'1 9 suggesting, obviously, that the latter extensions would dearly be
unconstitutional and the current one should also meet the same fate.
Justice Stevens also wrote a vigorous dissent. Justice Stevens relied on parallel
patent law opinions and perspectives to demonstrate that extending copyright
terms would inhibit the promotion of "Progress."11 In particular, Stevens cited
Pennock v. Dialogue, an 1829 Supreme Court patent law case that emphasized the
importance of public access to inventions as sources for future creativity and
progress.' Like increasing an inventor's compensation for an already completed
invention, extending copyright term retroactively would only serve to "frustrat[e]
the legitimate expectations of members of the public" who relied on public domain
works. 112 Justice Stevens' major complaint, however, appeared to be the majority's
lack of any meaningful inquiry and its overly deferential stance."t 3 Here, Justice
Stevens lamented that "the majority's contrary conclusion rest[ed] on the mistaken
premise that th[e] Court has virtually no role in reviewing congressional grants of
monopoly privileges to authors."" 4 The Court's next venture into copyright
legislation, Golan, did not inspire confidence that the Court would heed Justice
Stevens's caution of creating "judicially unreviewable" copyright legislation." 5
Indeed, Justice Stevens's concern may ring more loudly in the aftermath of that
decision.
B. Golan v. Holder: The Court's Second Failed Effort
Before discussing Golan, it is necessary to discuss the international setting that
served as the backdrop to that decision. That begins with the Berne Convention.
1. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works-By the
late 1880s, individual countries were developing separate national copyright laws." 6
Attempts at multilateral agreements, however, were limited, mostly involving
bilateral treaties.' 17 In 1886, in Berne, Switzerland, in a landmark event, ten
countries reached the first true multilateral international copyright agreement-the
10 8 Id.
10 9 Id.
"' Id. at 222-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
... See id. at 224-25 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829)).
112 See id. at 226-27.
113 See id. at 223.
114 id.
11 Id. at 242.
16 See Sam Ricketson, TheBirth oftbeBerne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &ARTs 9,10 (1986).
11 See id. at 14-15 (explaining that bilateral copyright agreements had become common by the
middle of the 1800s).
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Berne Convention."'8 The Berne Convention "recognized the need for more
uniform international protection of authors' rights, but advocated [a] limited means
for achieving this, mainly through the replacement of the numerous existing
bilateral agreements with a single multilateral instrument."
119
As evidenced by its initial members (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, the
United Kingdom, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Switzerland, and Tunisia), the Berne
Convention was "Eurocentric," and Berne's theoretical groundings reflected the
civil law "author's right" system of copyright."2 The author's right tradition is
based on a natural rights theory, that is, authors have a natural, inherent, right in
their works and are thus entitled to their creations without positive law providing
such rights. 21  Berne's grounding affects such important issues as the copyright
term, the moral rights of authors, and the ownership of copyrighted works. 22
One of the standards Berne members must implement is Berne's Rule of
Retroactivity, Article 18(1), which provides: "This Convention shall apply to all
works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the
public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of
118 See id. at 9, 29-30. Prior to the Berne Convention, other multilateral copyright agreements were
limited to a few countries and were entered into for political reasons. See id. at 9. Berne, on the other
hand, was open to all states, provided the members complied with the mandatory obligations imposed
by Berne. Id. Berne was born because of the need to protect against widespread piracy of foreign works,
for example, the United States' piracy of English books, and the Belgian piracy of French books. Id. at
12.
119 See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY 522, 535-36 (2001) ('the original Convention was intended to promote five objectives:
(1) the development of copyright laws in favor of authors in all civilized countries; (2) the elimination
over time of basing rights upon reciprocity, (3) the end of discrimination in rights between domestic and
foreign authors in all countries; (4) the abolition of formalities for the recognition and protection of
copyright in foreign works; and, (5) ultimately, the promotion of uniform international legislation for
the protection of literary and artistic works.").
o See id. at 513, 525 (describing the author's right system of copyright as prevalent in Europe and
the Berne Convention as "dearly Eurocentric").
121 Id. at 513. Such rights exist and laws simply accord formal recognition of these rights. Id. at 517.
The emphasis on the author's natural rights may stem in part from its origin in France following the
French Revolution. Id. at 517-18. When France's ancient regime was abolished by its 1789 Revolution,
the rights of man enshrined in the new revolutionary laws included the rights of authors in their works,
rooted in natural law. Ricketson, supra note 116, at 10. This is not to suggest that utilitarian goals do
not also underlie the natural rights tradition, simply that the utilitarian influence was very minor as
compared to the robust entitlement theory of natural rights. See DANIEL CHOW & EDWARD LEE,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 86 (2d ed.
2012) ("[I]t would be inaccurate to suggest that utilitarian and natural rights theories of copyright law
are mutually exclusive, or that the copyright and author's rights traditions are at odds. Strands of both
theories and traditions may well inform the development of copyright laws in the same countries,
although with varying degrees of influence. And, regardless .... today the international copyright
conventions require a certain set of minimum standards that will be common to all countries.").
" See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 119, at 513. Such contrasts affect issues such as whether
copyright can be owned by non-natural persons and whether employers have automatic control rights
over employee-created works, or only a non-exclusive exploitation right. See Paul Edward Geller,
Worldwide -Chain of Title- to Copyright, in 4 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT 103, 104
(1990).
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protection.""z Article 18 thus requires countries to restore protection to works that
fell into the protecting country's public domain for reasons other than term
expiration.1 24 For example, a national of Denmark can have works that fell into the
public domain in the United States for failure to provide copyright notice
"restored" to protection in the United States, if the work is still protected in
Denmark and was first published not less than thirty days prior to being published
in the United States.
125
The United States long objected to certain of Berne's minimum standards. It
thus refused to join the Union. 1 26 Moreover, because Berne's underlying theoretical
grounding was at odds with the United States' utilitarian approach, the United
States resisted Berne accession for over a century. 12 7 "[Faced with a ballooning
trade deficit and a need to restore U.S. competitiveness in world markets .... the
United States grudgingly bec[a]me a member" of Berne in 1989.1' This was "part
of its larger strategy to use the [GATT] Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations to strengthen international intellectual property protection." 129 As the
12 Paris Act Relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 18(1), July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, 41 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
124 See id.
" See Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 556-57 (3d Cir. 2002)
(describing requirements for restoring a foreign work's copyright). Berne's Rule of Retroactivity, which
is at odds with the general rule that laws apply prospectively, is limited in a couple of important respects.
First, with respect to works that fell into the public domain because the works' copyright term had
expired, Berne does not require retroactive protection. Berne Convention, supra note 123, art. 18(2) ("If,
however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen
into the public domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected
anew."). Second, Berne provides countries with discretion in determining how to implement the
retroactivity principle embodied in Article 18. See id. art. 18(3). Specifically, Berne Article 18(3)
provides: "The application of this principle shall be subject to any provisions contained in special
conventions to that effect existing or to be concluded between countries of the Union. In the absence of
such provisions, the respective countries shall determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of
application of this principle." Id. (emphasis added). By way of example, under Article 18(3), countries
have allowed parties that relied on a work's previous public domain status to continue using such works,
albeit by paying adequate compensation to the copyright owner. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012).
Berne's Rule of Retroactivity can be justified by the limited effect Berne would have had without
retroactive application. When first formed, many works meeting Berne requirements were not
protected. Unless Berne was applied retroactively, the number of works entitled to Berne protection
would have been minimal and Berne would have had limited impact. Prior to the Berne Convention,
there were wide discrepancies with respect to formalities. See DINWOODIE, ET AL., supra note 119, at
518-19. These formalities could include notice and registration, among others. Id. at 530. Berne soon
made clear that copyright was not to depend on satisfying formalities in countries outside the country of
origin. See id. at 528. As many works had been denied protection for failure to satisfy formalities, it
made sense to restore copyright to those works as well. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 879 &
n.3 (2012).
126 Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1283, 1287 (1998). However, "[e]ventually, nonadhering countries opted for the more minimal
national-treatment obligations contained in the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952," of which the





world's leader in intellectual property production and export, the United States
could no longer justify denying protection to foreign works; more importantly, the
United States desired protection for its nationals' works abroad. 130
In implementing Berne, however, the United States admittedly took a
minimalist approach, amending the U.S. Copyright Act only when there was a
clear conflict with an express Beme provision. 31 The provision that Congress
responded to in enacting the act at issue in Golan was Article 18's retroactivity
mandate.' 32 This proved troublesome. 133 Because of the potential disruptive impact
of removing works from the public domain, the United States' initial position was
that the United States complied with its Article 18 obligations simply by virtue of
protecting future works. 134 To be generous, this was a questionable position.
Perhaps recognizing so, the House Judiciary Committee also "indicated ... that it
had not definitively rejected 'retroactive' protection for preexisting foreign works"
but would defer consideration "until 'a more thorough examination of
10 See Ricketson, supra note 116, at 13 (describing protection for citizens' own works abroad as a
turning point in extending domestic protection to authors of foreign works).
131 See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L.
REV. 373, 393 (1995). The U.S. State Department assembled the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention to determine how the United States could comply with Berne. Id.
at 391.
132 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881-82 (2012).
133 See id. at 878. Two other provisions merit discussion: (1) Article 6 bis's moral rights provision;
and (2) Article 5's prohibition against formalities. Berne Convention, supra note 123, at 35-36. The
United States concluded that no change to the Copyright Act was necessary to comply with the latter
two. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 37-38, 40-41 (1988). Although Congress had traditionally
conditioned copyright protection on compliance with formalities (e.g., registration, renewal, and notice),
it had gradually eliminated these requirements. See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright
Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415, 1415 & n.1 (2013). As for moral rights, these rights
protect, among other rights, both the author's reputation and the integrity of their work. See H.R. REP.
NO. 100-609, supra note 133, at 32-33. The House Committee on the Judiciary, whose report
accompanied the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, took the dubious position that
existing state and federal laws already afforded authors equivalent protection. See id. at 34. Specifically
mentioned were: state law rights of publicity and prohibitions against breach of contract, fraud and
misrepresentation, unfair competition, and defamation; and federal protections against unfair
competition afforded by Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. As such, the Committee found that
"current United States law [met] the requirements of Article 6[ ]his." I. at 38. Despite taking this
position, the United States demanded that the major international intellectual property treaty, TRIPS,
expressly exclude moral rights from members' commitments. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 9(1), Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 81, 87 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Monica Kilian, A Hollow Victoryfor the Common Law? TRIPS and
the MoralRights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 321-22 (2003). Accordingly,
TRIPS Article 9(1) provides that "Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement
in respect of the rights conferred under article 6[ ]his of [Berne]." TRIPS, supra note 133, at 87. This
effectively shielded Members from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for failure to provide
authors with moral rights.
4 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(3), 102 Stat.
2853, 2853. The BCIA indicated that the protection of future foreign works satisfied Article 18. See id.
("The amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of
this Act, satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention .... ").
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Constitutional, commercial, and consumer considerations [wa]s possible'."135 The
Committee recognized that whether, and how, Congress could provide retroactive
protection to works already in the public domain was a difficult question, "possibly
with constitutional dimensions." 136 But, ultimately the Committee deemed it
unnecessary to address until the question was "presented in the context of specific
facts." 137 In short, Article 18 merited further discussion.
In 1994, to accede to TRIPS, Congress relented and enacted Section 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 138 perfecting U.S. implementation of Berne by
finally addressing Article 18's retroactivity obligation. According to Congress,
failure to comply at this point threatened to expose the United States to possible
trade sanctions, which was a threat not available under Beme. 139 Section 514,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A, grants copyright protection to preexisting works of
Berne member countries, protected in their country of origin, that fell into the
public domain in the United States for any of three reasons: (1) the United States
did not protect works from the country of origin at the time of publication, (2) the
United States did not protect sound recordings fixed before 1972, or (3) the author
had failed to comply with U.S. statutory formalities."4 It is this U.S. codification
that was the subject of Golan, to which we now turn.
While Eldred left open whether Congress could remove works from the public
domain, the Court squarely confronted that question in Golan. In Golan, the
petitioners were "orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and others who
formerly enjoyed free access to works that [Section 104A] removed from the public
domain." 41 These parties argued that the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment both mandated that works that entered the public domain forever
135 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 52).
136 H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 51.
137 Id. The House Report of the Judiciary Committee stated "any solution to the question of
retroactivity can be addressed after adherence to Berne when a more thorough examination of
Constitutional, commercial, and consumer considerations is possible." Id. at 52.
13 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109 (2012)).
139 See TRIPS, supra note 133, art. 9(1) ("Members shall comply with Articles 1-21 and the
Appendix of the Berne Convention. However, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this
Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6[ ]bis of that Convention or of the rights
derived therefrom.") TRIPS provides what many describe as a robust and effective dispute settlement
mechanism, with possible trade sanctions for failing to comply with its obligations. See Golan, 132 S. Ct.
at 880-81. Fearing possible TRIPS-related WTO complaints, Congress passed Section 104A. See id. at
881. This did not escape the Golan Court's attention: "[tihe landscape changed in 1994" given the
.specter of WTO enforcement proceedings [which] bolstered the credibility of [American] trading
partners' threats to challenge the United States for inadequate compliance with Article 18." Id.
'- 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2012). As permitted by Berne, Section 104A provided limited
protection for reliance parties by allowing parties that reproduced the restored work to continue doing so
for a year after the copyright holder provided a notice of intent to restore, and by allowing parties who
created derivative works to continue creating and exploiting those works upon adequate compensation to
the copyright holder. Id. § 104A(d)(2)-(3).
141 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 875.
2015-2016]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
remain there.142 Justice Ginsburg again authored the majority opinion, in which the
Court rejected both the Copyright Clause and First Amendment challenges,
holding that "[n]either the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment
... makes the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory that works may never
exit."143
With respect to the Copyright Clause, the petitioners made two primary
arguments. First, by taking works out of the public domain and according them
new protection, the Act violated the boundary of "limited Times."' 44 Second,
because the Act could not provide incentives for artists to create-as the works
were already created-the Act did not "promote the Progress of Science." 145 In
rejecting both of these arguments, the Court once again grounded its decision in
the text, history, precedent, and wide discretion granted to Congress.
2. The "Limited Times" Analysis-The Golan petitioners' primary line of attack
was that removing works from the public domain violated the "limited Times"
constraint "by turning a fixed and predictable period into one that can be reset or
resurrected at any time, even after it expires." 1 6 The petitioners distinguished
Eldred by noting that in Eldred, rather than remove works from the public domain
and protect them anew, the CTEA merely extended existing works.' 47 The Court
nevertheless found Eldred "largely dispositive." 48
The Court found that petitioners' distinction between Eldred and Golan was
without significance. As the term at issue in Eldred was limited, so too, was the
term at issue in Golan.49 The Court pointed out that some works protected under
Section 104A received less protection than other works.'5 0 At most, protection for
restored works would be for the full term (life of the author plus seventy years), but
in the vast majority of cases the term would be less because Section 104A did not
account for time lost during the period of no protection.' 5 1
The Golan petitioners attempted to further distinguish Eldred with an
unconventional argument. Relying on statements in Eldred implying that Congress
could not remove expired works from the public domain, petitioners argued that
Section 104A did precisely that. 52 More specifically, they argued that the initial
term of protection for these restored works was "zero," after which the "expired"
142 Id. at 878. As stated earlier, because this Article is trained on the limits imposed by the
Copyright Clause, the First Amendment analysis is not considered here. See supra note 24 (analyzing
petitioners' First Amendment argument).
143 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
"4 Id. at 884.
145 Id. at 888.
1 Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
147 See id. at 884-85.
148 id.
149 See id.
"0 See id. at 878.
151 Id.
151 See id. at 884; Brief for Petitioners at 22-23, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545).
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works fell into the public domain."5 3 The Court summarily dispensed with this
argument, criticizing it as making "scant sense."154 The Court stated that "a 'limited
time' of exclusivity must begin before it may end. "lSS The Court, thus, did not rule
on whether works that indeed fell into the public domain through expiration of the
term could be renewed or restored. This opening may have important implications,
as discussed later.
The Court also rejected the second "limited Times" argument the petitioners
advanced-a perpetual copyright.15 6 Petitioners believed Section 104A presented a
more forceful argument of perpetual copyrights than in Eldred. Specifically, if
works can be removed from the public domain, Congress can institute a second
"limited" term after the first expires; it can provide a third "limited" term after that,
and so on, thus achieving a perpetual copyright.' 57 As in Eldred, the Court gave
short shrift to this argument.' The Court stated that "the hypothetical legislative
misbehavior petitioners posit is far afield from the case before us."159 By "according
equitable treatment to ... disfavored [ ] authors, Congress can hardly be charged
with a design to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual copyrights."'
6 °
3. The "Promoting the Progress of Science" Analysis-Petitioners' "promoting the
Progress of Science" argument fared little better. This argument rested on the claim
that promoting "Progress" required the creation of at least one new work, and any
act passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause must spur the creation of new
works . 61 Because Section 104A provides renewed protection for works already
created, it could not logically provide any incentive to create even a single new
work. 62 Conceding that the "promote Progress" preamble did limit congressional
power, the Court nevertheless found that providing incentives to create new works
was not the sole means by which Congress could "promote Progress." 63 Again
relying on Eldred, and acknowledging that providing incentives for authors to
create new works "is urely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge
and learning," the Court interpreted "promotes Progress" to also include the
dissemination of works. 6I Congress could find that "exemplary adherence to Beme"
1"I Golan, 123 S. Ct. at 885. Such a term would also violate international obligations for providing
at least the term of life of the author plus fifty years, or the CTEA's life of the author plus seventy years.
See William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publisbers Managed to Steal the
Breadfrom Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &ENT. L.J. 661,693-94 (1996).







161 Id. at 888.
16 2 id.
163 See id.
164 Id. at 888-89.
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would lead to the dissemination of works.165 In so finding, the Court had "no
warrant to reject the rational judgment Congress made." 166
III. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE'S DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK:
WHERE FOR ART THOU?
In analyzing Golan and Eldred, three separate but interrelated threads emerge.
First, the Court will be extremely deferential to Congress with respect to copyright
legislation. The Court repeatedly pronounced that Congress decides how best to
pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives and the Court would not "second-guess"
Congress, however "debatable or arguable" its actions may be.167  Second,
"international concerns," even those not rising to international treaty obligations,
will justify copyright expansion. 168 While resting on international concerns breaks
no new ground, the extended reach of this notion is of concern. Finally, in both
Eldred and Golan, the Court took pains to distinguish the CTEA and Section
104A from congressional attempts to evade the perpetual copyright prohibition, 169
suggesting that the Court will strike down legislation that provides for unlimited
terms, including unlimited terms disguised as limited terms. The Court failed,
however, in either case to describe what such attempts might resemble. Each of
these three threads warrants further discussion.
A. Lost in Unfettered Discretion
The Court is unquestionably right to defer to Congress in matters that the
Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to regulate. To do more
might require the Court to engage in difficult line drawing, e.g., how long does
"limited Times" actually mean? Moreover, balancing interests is a task better left to
Congress than the Court. But deference has its limits. Since Marbury v. Madison,
the Supreme Court's role has been to interpret the Constitution and inspect
congressional power. 170 The doctrine of judicial review, 17' although not explicitly
165 Id. at 889.
166 Id. ("A well-functioning international copyright system would likely encourage the dissemination
of existing and future works."). Justice Breyer again dissented, this time joined by Justice Alito. Id. at
899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,208 (2003).
168 See id. at 212.
169 Golan, 123 S. Ct. at 885; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.
170 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("I'he powers of the legislature are
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.").
171 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (discussing the role of judicial review in constitutional
interpretation); Saikrishna B. Prakash &John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887 (2003); Theodore W. Ruger, WA Question Which Convulses a Nation": The Early Republic's
Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing for a more dear
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addressed in the Constitution, was established in Marbury as an implied, necessary
power of the judicial branch, granted in order to maintain a balanced government
and to uphold the "supreme Law of the Land."1 72 As Chief Judge Marshall
understood over two centuries ago, to scrutinize an act of Congress as against the
Constitution is to perform the very duty imposed upon officers of the judiciary,
whose role without such an imposition would be "worse than solemn mockery." 73
Two centuries later, Chief Justice Roberts likewise reminds us: "[T]here can be no
question that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal
power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits."174 Whether it
is under a strict scrutiny standard or a more relaxed deferential standard, this is the
role of the judiciary and the Court must exercise it. As such, one might legitimately
question whether the Court is exercising this role with respect to Congress's
enactment of copyright laws. In over two hundred and twenty years since the
Copyright Clause was enacted, the Supreme Court has never found legislation
passed pursuant to Congress's authority unconstitutional. 175 The Court's extreme
and consistent framework for the Court to conduct judicial review of legislative action); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular
Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113,
113 (2003) (noting the basic rationale for judicial review, as expressed in Marbury).
172 U.S. CONST., art. VI; see also Prakash & Yoo, supra note 171, at 887; James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893)
(stating that a court should only declare an act of the legislature as void when "those who have the right
to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not
open to rational question."). For arguments against or for a limited role of judicial review, see, for
example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Wy the Court Erred in Deciding
Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292 (2000) (criticizing the Court's sua sponte
raising of constitutional issue as "violat[ing] basic principles of separation of powers" and "usurping the
judgment of the executive branch about how to exercise its prosecutorial authority," thus "exceed[ing]
the appropriate judicial role in raising a major constitutional issue not presented by the parties that in no
way concerned the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear the matter."); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis- -vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1556-1557
(1977) (distinguishing between constitutional issues regarding states' rights versus federal power
(federalism) and those related to individual rights (mostly arising out of the Bill of Rights), arguing that
the former should not be within the jurisdiction of the courts).
173 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
174 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579-80 (2012).
175 Judicial review is not judicial activism disguised. Judicial activism is a mostly pejorative term
implying that the Court imposes its own judgment for that of Congress in striking down law enacted by
the legislature. For definitions of judicial activism, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 211 (1985) (defining "judicial activism" as when judges act
"contrary to the will of the other branches of the government," thereby "taking power from the other
branches"); Glendon Schubert, A Functional Interpretation: Judicial Policy Making, in THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17 (David F. Forte
ed., 1972) (defining judicial activism as "whenever [a court's] policies are in conflict with those of other
major decision-makers"). Some examples of acts that have been described as activist include the Lochner
Era pro-business free-market policies, the Warren Court's expansion of civil rights during the 1960s,
and recent court decisions undoing habeas corpus laws. See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint:
Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1083, 1094 (2002). Whether judicial activism is
"good" or "bad" depends on how one views the court's function. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1082 (1997) ("The extent to which judicial
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deference to Congress in this area is troubling. The Court's deference in matters of
policy cannot "become abdication in matters of law," nor can the Court's respect for
Congress's policy judgments "extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power
that the Constitution carefully constructed."176 Either Congress has been truly
remarkable staying within the boundaries of its constitutional copyright authority-
unlike it has been with any other constitutional grant of authority-or the Court
has abdicated its duty to scrutinize congressional copyright acts.
As to line drawing, this is always a difficult task. The Constitution is necessarily
vague. But the difficulty in drawing lines does not abrogate the Court's
responsibility in drawing them in appropriate circumstances. Moreover, the Court
need not necessarily draw a line in all cases. For example, the Court in Eldred
might have reasonably concluded that extending the term an additional twenty
years exceeded congressional authority, without stating precisely how long
protection should last.177
B. Lost in Questionable Grounding
In both Eldred and Golan, Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on Congress's concern
about complying with international obligations. 78 In its most simple form, this
argument is as follows: if the United States complies with international obligations,
it will be better able to protect U.S. authors' rights abroad, and compliance will
engender a respect for a strong international intellectual property regime protecting
intellectual property rights. In Eldred, the international concern was the EU Term
Directive.1 79 In Golan, Congress passed Section 104A to comply with Berne's
Retroactivity provision (even if only after, and because, the U.S. acceded to
TRIPS). i80 In both of these cases, the Court said that so long as international
commitments are present, Congress is justified in enacting copyright legislation.181
As the world leader in intellectual property production and export, the United
lawmaking is improper depends upon one's conception of the appropriate judicial role."). Professors
Jeffries and Levinson argue that defining judicial activism is more nuanced and depends upon, among
other things, whether the legislation takes away rights rather than extends rights. See John C. Jeffries,
Jr., & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
1211, 1211-1212 (1998).
176 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Although the Copyright Clause grants broad legislative power to Congress, that grant has
limits. And in my view this statute falls outside them.").
177 See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Neither do I share the Court's aversion
to line-drawing in this case. Even if it is difficult to draw a single dear bright line, the Court could easily
decide (as I would decide) that this particular statute simply goes too far. And such examples--of what
goes too far-sometimes offer better constitutional guidance than more absolute-sounding rules. In any
event, 'this Court sits' in part to decide when a statute exceeds a constitutional boundary." (quoting
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
178 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205; Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012).
1'9 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.
"0 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881-82.
" See id. at 894.
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States has obvious commitments in seeking strong global protection. But such
concerns cannot trump the Constitution. Such international concerns must further
the Copyright Clause's objective to "promote the Progress of Science." 182 If Berne,
TRIPS, or the European Union Copyright Term Directive require intellectual
property protection that go beyond the limits of the Constitution, such laws must
fail.
1. The Relationsip between treaties and the Constitution--Under the
Constitution, a treaty, like a federal statute, is part of the "supreme law of the
Land."183  Self-executing treaties (those that do not require implementing
legislation) automatically become effective as domestic law immediately upon entry
into force. Berne is not self-executing in the United States,1 84 and it does not
become effective as domestic law until implementing legislation is enacted, such as
Section 104A.1 5 While scholars debate the legal relationship between the U.S.
Constitution and the treaties to which the United States is a party, "conventional
wisdom is that constitutional provisions always trump treaty obligations."186
Congress is powerless to do under a treaty what is strictly prohibited under the
182 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1
13 Id. art. VI, d. 2.
"' Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 § 4(c), 102 Stat. 2853,
2855 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 104(c) (2014)). Congress made this clear in Section 104(c) of the Copyright
Act of 1976, as amended by the BCIA, which provides:
No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this title may be claimed by virtue
of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the
United States thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that derive
from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the common law, shall not be expanded or
reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the
adherence of the United States thereto.
Id.
1 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act was passed under the so-called fast track procedure. See,
e.g., Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 631, 633 (1994). Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 set forth specific procedures giving
the President the ability to negotiate trade agreements with the understanding that Congress will either
pass or reject the agreement without modification within ninety days. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, § 151, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2211 (2014)). Section 161 of that Act
requires the U.S. Trade Representative to keep members of Congress informed on the status of trade
agreement negotiations and to consult on a continuing basis with the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Id. at § 161, 88 Stat. at 2008 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2211 (2014)).
15 William M. Carter, Jr., Rethinking the Constitution-Treaty Relationship.. A Reply to Remy Z. Levin
& Paul Chen, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 261, 261 (2012). Others contend that "characterizing this
relationship in absolutist terms is inaccurate and misleading: while the Constitution does sometimes
override treaty obligations, international law and domestic constitutional law sometimes interact in a
dialogic manner, with treaty obligations and constitutional norms operating to inform or 'adjust' one
another." Id. (describing the argument of Remy Z. Levin and Paul Chen). "[Tihe relationship is a more
nuanced process of 'mutual adjustment' between treaties and the Constitution than is commonly
understood." Id.
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Constitution.'8 7 Accordingly, the Court must (1) ensure that "international
concerns" do not trump the Constitution, and only then can they (2) determine
whether these international concerns justify the action taken by Congress. The
Court paid lip service to the former, it simply avoided inquiry into the latter,
relying solely on statements by Congress without examining those statements.
2. American Exceptionalism Undercuts the Court's Reliance on U.S. Compliance
with International Obligations-The Court's reliance on Congress's international
concerns in both Eldred and Golan seems misdirected. This is not to suggest that
international obligations are not relevant or significant. Certainly they are.
Technological innovations, the disappearance of national borders, and the need to
protect the United States' position as the world's leader in intellectual property
make international concerns so. In Eldred, however, the international concerns did
not rise to the level of an international treaty obligation. 88 Rather, the CTEA was
based upon a European Union Directive that increased protection for EU
members.'89 The U.S. was not required to also increase protection (at least not as
part of its international obligations).' 90 Thus, reliance on this as justification to
extend domestic copyright protection seems weak.'91
In Golan, the Court relied on statements from Congress that the potential of a
trading partner bringing a TRIPS-related complaint justified Section 104A.192 In
particular, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the difference between 1989, when
the United States acceded to Berne with its "minimalist approach," and 1994, when
Congress ultimately passed Section 104A to comply with Berne's Retroactivity
provision, was TRIPS' enforcement mechanism. 193 In other words, Congress
passed Section 104A after the U.S. acceded to TRIPS, rather than Berne, because
TRIPS had "teeth." Certainly, the dispute settlement mechanism distinguishes
TRIPS from other international intellectual property treaties. By being subject to
1"7 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (finding that the Treaty Clause does not permit the
circumvention of constitutional limits). But see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (finding
that the Treaty Clause permits Congress to do what is beyond its enumerated Article I powers); Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: .n (Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 357-59 (2007) (arguing that it might be appropriate to allow intellectual
property law to be made via treaty when it could not be enacted as domestic legislation).
"I See supra Part IIA.
189 See supra Part IIA.
190 See supra Part II.A. The EU did limit increased term protection for non-EU authors to those
countries that provided reciprocal treatment. Thus, even though not mandated by international
agreement or treaty, as say Berne or TRIPS, a policy argument-as opposed to an international
mandate--can justify the CTEA.
191 Of course, even if not required by international treaty, the EU would provide extended
protection only to those countries that provided reciprocal treatment. Thus, given the desire to give
American authors greater protection abroad, the United States was, in fact, required to provide at least
such protection, but only to the European Union. Whether this might have violated TRIPS most-
favored nation principle is open to debate.
192 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881-82 (2012).
193 Id.
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an elaborate enforcement framework, hailed as the "crown jewel" of the entire
WT7O system,'94 TRIPS represented a significant departure from Berne and other
multilateral intellectual property agreements. The irony here is that in Eldred there
was no international obligation and in Golan, the U.S. had an obligation under
Berne to implement Article 18 but failed to do so for over five years and only
implemented it contemplating possible retaliation from member countries filing
WTO complaints. Nevertheless, to those untrained in or unfamiliar with
international law, grounding discretion on international obligations has force.
However, the argument has less force in view of the U.S.'s lack of compliance with
its international intellectual property obligations, where the U.S. has been
"exceptional," playing by its own rules.
This American exceptionalism takes on a number of different forms. Harold
Koh describes it as "instances when the United States proposes that a different rule
should apply to itself and its allies from the one that should apply to the rest of the
world."1 95 Examples of this form include the United States' treatment of the
International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and the
execution of juvenile offenders or persons with mental disabilities.196
Michael Ignatieff defines American exceptionalism as referring to the
. . . ways in which the United States actually exempts itself from certain
international law rules and agreements, even ones that it may have played a
critical role in framing, through such techniques as noncompliance;
nonratification; ratification with reservations, understandings, and declarations;
194 Sanjeev Dav6, TRIPs: International Trademark Law That Promotes Global Trade, 12 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 458, at 459 (2001). See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism:
Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1134 (2009); Deborah E.
Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTO
Agreements, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 561,583 (2002). Commentators have described the DSU as including
a series of remedial steps for the DSB to take in response to a violation, leading to
the ultimate sanction of retaliation by a complainant country against the
offending country if it fails to comply. First, the violating country is afforded a
"reasonable period of time" to implement the WTO recommendations, which
implementation typically consists of the country bringing its law into compliance.
As a suggested guideline, the time for implementation should not exceed fifteen
months, although "the time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the
particular circumstances."
Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 401,407 (2011) (citations omitted).
195 Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCETIMONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 116 (Michael Ignatieffed., 2005).
196 Id. at 116-17. Professor Koh also mentions additional examples, including "declining to
implement orders of the International Court of Justice with regard to the death penalty, or claiming a
Second Amendment exclusion from a proposed global ban on the illicit transfer of small arms and light
weapons." Id. at 117. He goes on to note that "[iun the post-9/11 environment, further examples have
proliferated: particularly, America's attitude toward the global justice system, and holding Taliban
detainees on Guantanamo without Geneva Convention hearings." Id.
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the non-self-executing treating doctrine; or the latest U.S. gambit, unsigning the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).19 7
There are at least two other noted forms of American exceptionalism: (1)
America's legal self-sufficiency, i.e., the idea that "practices of foreign countries are
irrelevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation" and (2) American double standards,
"whereby the United States judges itself by different standards from those it uses to
judge other states, and judges its friends and its enemies by different standards." 198
As pertinent here, the United States has acted in "exceptional" ways in
complying with its international intellectual property obligations. Paradoxically, the
United States is simultaneously both a leader and an outlier in promoting and
enforcing intellectual property rights. Even though the United States had acceded
to Berne, only after remaining outside the then-premier international copyright
treaty for over a century, and the United States was the major force behind TRIPS,
the Court's praise of "unstinting adherence to" Berne and TRIPS was curious, at
best, or ill-informed, at worst. Already noted is the United States' initial refusal to
comply with Berne. The record regarding TRIPS is more glaring.
The United States has been a TRIPS member, subject to the treaty's
obligations, since its creation in 1994.199 In the first fifteen years of TRIPS/WTO
dispute settlements, there have been twenty-nine TRIPS-related complaints, of
which all but eight were resolved without further action.2°° Of the eight matters
that went to a WrTO panel for decision, all but one found at least one TRIPS
violation.20 1 Significantly, all of the offending countries but one enacted changes to
their laws to bring the offending laws into compliance.20 2 The lone country not to
implement WTO panel adverse decisions was the United States-and it has failed
to comply twice, the only two times it has been found to violate TRIPS.203 This
197 Id. at 113 (explaining Michael Ignatieffs definition).
1 Id. at 113. Not all countries have the power to be "exceptional." Professors Goldsmith and
Posner argue that countries will (or will not) follow international law according to their own self-
interest. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 7-
10 (2005). Posner and Goldsmith posit that states act rationally. See id. Thus, states comply with
international obligations and norms to promote their national interests, and under this, stronger states,
such as the United States, have more freedom to depart from WTO and international obligations. Their
theory raises larger issues, such as whether TRIPS or other international treaties have the force of law,
and whether compliance with treaty obligations should be viewed as a formal obligation or simply an
opportunity for countries to decide whether compliance with such obligations would further the
country's own self-interest. These issues are not within the scope of this article.
199 Member Information: United States of America and the WT, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu.agreements-index-e.htm?id=A26# (last visited
Jan. 24,2016).
205 Lee, supra note 194, at 405.
202 See iid.
" Id. "The U.S. has not corrected its violations in the Section 110(5) and the Havana Club Rum
disputes. The average time it took the offending countries, other than the U.S., to correct their
violations was less than a year (10.4 months)." Id. at 411-12. It has been fifteen and fourteen years-and
counting--for the United States to comply. Id. at 412. See also Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Agreement,
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Article's contention is not that the United States should have implemented (or
should implement) these changes.2°4 Rather, it is that the United States' claim of
unstinting adherence to its international obligations is suspect, and upon closer
scrutiny the Court may have found such claims wanting.
3. The 1790 Act as an Additional Justification?-To be fair, the Court did not
rest solely on Congress's claims of international concerns in finding the CTEA and
Section 104A constitutional; the Court also relied on congressional practice and
history, including the 1790 Act, subsequent copyright acts, and decisions
interpreting patent grants. 20 5 This Article's primary criticism here is that the Court
relied on the 1790 Act at all. The 1790 Act was the first federal scheme protecting
copyright.21 Prior to the 1790 Act, there existed no express federal recognition of
author's rights. Arguably, no public domain existed until a copyright scheme was in
place.20 7 If so, then it is odd to suggest that the first act pulled works out of the
public domain.
2 0 8
As to the Court's reliance on other previous extensions, Justice Stevens observed
that repeated, unconstitutional acts by Congress do not obviate the need to
challenge the constitutionality of a congressional action in other appropriate
cases. 209 The Court never had occasion to review those acts. At most, previous
extensions support the contention that those extensions may have been
constitutional; they do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that subsequent
extensions are. In addition, as explored further below, even if the earlier acts were
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-c/dispue/dispuagreements index_
e.htm?id=A26# (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (listing all of the WTO disputes and describing the outcome
of the cases).
o Indeed, elsewhere I have cautioned against the United States implementing international
obligations that are constitutionally suspect or inappropriately limit its discretion in important domestic
areas. See Donald P. Harris, TRIPS'Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement Can
Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. &BuS. 99,102 (2004).
... See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884-86 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200-03
(2003).
206 SeeAct ofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
0 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 61, at 52 ("Like the environment, the public domain must be
'invented' before it is saved.').
10s Additionally, the Court relies on evidence that works were pulled from the public domain via
various private bills and court rulings following the 1790 Act. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 876, 886 (stating
that "[h]istorical practice corroborates our reading of the Copyright Clause to permit full U.S.
compliance with Berne," and thus supporting the protection of previously unprotected works"). But only
one of these listed instances, Evans v. Jordan, explicitly involved restoration of protection after an
expired term. See id. (citing Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815)). The other instances cited
by the Court as involving retroactive protection are distinguishable. In three of the private bills,
copyright was restored to works that previously had been in the public domain, but not due to term
expiration. See id. at 886-87 (citing, among others, McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843); Act of
Sept. 25, 1941, ch. 421, 55 Stat. 732 (1941); Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 215, 27 Stat. 743 (1893)). The
private bills concerning patents were bills that retroactively protected patents when those patents were
invalidated because of an accident, inadvertence or mistake. See id. at 887 (citing Act of July 3, 1832, ch.
162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559, 559).
209 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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constitutional, subsequent acts can fail as, in the aggregate, they, in conjunction
with the earlier acts, may result in a perpetual copyright.
C. Lost in a Dubious Promotion of "the Progress of Science"?
The Golan Court's finding that Section 104A "promotes Progress" is even less
persuasive. Conceding that increased retroactive protection could not provide
incentives to create new works, the Court announced that dissemination of works
can also "promote Progress."210 Yet generally, copyright protection results in less
dissemination, as increased prices drive down demand. 211 Moreover, the works
granted restored protection were in the public domain, free for public access and
dissemination. Thus, the Court's justification for dissemination of existing works
leaves much to be desired.
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg's closest explanation is her statement (relying on
copyright industry representatives' statements) that "full compliance with Berne...
would expand the foreign markets available to U.S. authors and invigorate
protection against piracy of U.S. works abroad ... ,thereby benefitting copyright
intensive industries stateside and inducing greater investment in the creative
process."212 But even here, the logic is thin. For one, new markets abroad certainly
lead to dissemination of works abroad. It does nothing for domestic dissemination.
It is difficult to imagine the Framers of the Constitution drafted the 1790
Copyright Clause with this in mind (particularly as the U.S. failed to protect
foreign works until 1891).213
More likely, Justice Ginsburg believed that increased revenue from works
disseminated abroad would encourage domestic authors to increase the production
of works at home. But this ignores two points. First, increasing production for
domestic works relates to creation, not dissemination, and the Court expressly
rested its holding on dissemination. 21 4 Second, even if furthering dissemination of
works, either at home or abroad, the Constitution and "traditional understanding"
speak in terms of protecting authors, not the "noncreative disseminators" that
Section 104A seeks to protect.215 As Professor Gordon observes, it is not that
dissemination is unimportant to progress; rather it is important only because it aids
210 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
2 Id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 68-70,213-14 (2003)).
212 Id. at 889.
213 See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under the 1909 Copyright Act, 26
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 285, at 291 (2010). Section 104A also might result
in dissemination of foreign works in the U.S. Here, however, we would have to believe that renewed
protection of works increased incentives for foreign authors to disseminate works in the U.S. more than
free public domain access would. This is doubtful. Even more, as mentioned above, revenues to foreign
authors seems far removed from what the Framers intended under the Copyright Clause.
214 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888-89.
215 Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, REV.
OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES, August 3,2013, at 1,4.
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in inducing disseminators to pay authors for creations to be disseminated.21 6 In
other words, dissemination contributes to authors' incentives; absent this,
dissemination for the sole benefit of disseminators is outside the goal of copyright.
Section 104A provides incentives for disseminators to distribute the works, and
allows them to reap rewards for increased or renewed protection (hence, heavy
lobbying by publishers and other noncreative disseminators).2 17 It does not assist in
authorial incentives, and it is thus an improper ground upon which to uphold the
Act's constitutionality.
D. Lost in an Unlimited "Limited Time":A Perpetual Copyright by Another Name?
The final criticism is trained on the Court's "limited Times" analysis and
whether Congress created perpetual copyrights. The Court took pains in both
Eldred and Golan to distinguish those facts from the "hypothetical legislative
misbehavior" of a perpetual copyright scheme.218 The Court suggested that if the
scheme was a perpetual copyright by another name, the scheme would be
unconstitutional. 2 19 But, according to the Court, neither the Eldred nor the Golan
petitioners could support such a claim. 
2 °
The Court summarily rejected the Golan petitioners' argument that works in
the public domain had already enjoyed a limited term (of zero), and throughout the
opinion remarked that Section 104A did not extend new protection to works that
had fallen into the public domain because their term expired. 221 The Golan Court
viewed the public domain as consisting only of works that enjoyed a full and fair
term of protection. 22 2 The Court chided the petitioners for implying that Congress
was trying to surreptitiously evade the "limited Times" limitation, stating that there
was no congressional "design to move stealthily towards a regime of perpetual
copyright."22 The Court was correct, of course, in declaring that each act by itself
did not evince a regime of perpetual copyright. But this misses the point. The
Court failed to appreciate that a perpetual copyright might comprise not only a
copyright with an unlimited term, but also a copyright with a finite term
perpetually extended. By looking solely to each specific term, the Court looked past
this second form of a perpetual copyright.
The Court's statement also raises two questions. First, what does a
"congressional design to move stealthily towards a regime of perpetual copyright"
look like? Second, is such a regime unconstitutional? Ginsburg's opinions in both
216 See id. at 5 ("[D]isseminators are honored in copyright only for the purpose of assisting authorial
incentives").
217 See id.
218 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200, 209-10 (2003).
219 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision allowed
Congress to extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum, creating a perpetual copyright).
220 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209-10; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885.
221 See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882.




Eldred and Golan suggest that the answer to the second question is yes, although
the opinions could have been clearer. The answer to the first question is even less
clear.
A "congressional design" might begin by gradually but purposefully extending
the term of copyright. The history of copyright term extensions is illustrative. As
noted earlier, when the Copyright Clause was enacted, the copyright term was
fourteen years, with a possible renewal for another fourteen years. 224 Over the
course of the next two centuries, the term gradually increased from fourteen years
(1790)225 to twenty-eight years (1831),2" to fifty-six years (1909),227 to life of the
author plus fifty years (1976),228 to its current term of life of the author plus seventy
years (1998).229 By itself, this may have little significance. But this expansion stands
in stark contrast to the patent term, which is also constrained by the IP Clause's
"limited Times" prescription. The patent term, as did the copyright term, began at
fourteen years (1790).23 0 Unlike the copyright term's tremendous increase in the
ensuing two centuries, the patent term was extended twice-once in 1861 to
seventeen years,2 31 then in 1994 to its current term of twenty years. 232
The copyright term's spectacular expansion might not, standing alone, be
indicative of a stealthy design to achieve a perpetual copyright. However, the ability
of Congress to extend existing copyright terms changes the very nature of copyright
term limits. If a term was set to expire, and Congress, for whatever reason,
extended the term, it could do so repeatedly and indefinitely. Allowing Congress to
2 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).225 
Id.
__ Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436-37.
227Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23,35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
221 Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 3, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2572, 2572 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
229 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
0 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110.
231 Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16,12 Stat. 246, 249.
232 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). The original term of patents actually provided for a term not to
exceed fourteen years. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. at 109-10. It is not dear whether patents
were actually granted for a term less than fourteen years. As for the change in terms from seventeen
years to twenty years, the change may not have amounted to much of a change at all. The seventeen-
year grant was measured from the time the patent was issued, while the twenty-year term is measured
from the time the patent application is filed. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. at 249; 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Because patent applications take about three years to prosecute, these terms
provided for similar protection.
The difference between the patent term and the copyright term might owe itself to the differences
in subject matter protected under each. It is plausible that Congress could value inventions as more
useful to society and thus believe this intellectual property should fall into the public domain more
quickly. It is also true that patent protection is considered significantly stronger than copyright
protection, justifying a shorter term. Neither of these explanations, however, explain why the first
copyright and patent terms were equal, nor do they adequately justify why the copyright term has grown
exponentially longer than the patent term.
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extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum could resemble a perpetual
copyright.23 3 This was the petitioner's argument in Eldred.
2 34
The stealthy design might also include the ability to remove works from the
public domain, perhaps for a limited number of reasons, such as those found in
Section 104A. Rather than just further protecting existing copyrights, giving new
terms to public domain works allows for the extension of copyright terms for an
unlimited duration. This was the petitioners' argument in Golan.2
35
The design would be complete, it might be argued, if Congress were permitted
to not only remove works from the public domain, but also to provide new terms to
public domain works that bave already expired. Admittedly, Golan did not go this
far, and one might seek solace by limiting the Court's decisions to its precise facts
and to Section 104A's express limitations for restoring works that fell into the
public domain for one of three specific reasons-none of which was term
expiration. 36 The works restored under Section 104A, as Ginsburg repeatedly
made dear, never received any (or full) protection. 237 Unfortunately, the Court's
broad language leaves open the possibility that Congress can withdraw works from
the public domain for any reason, including term expiration. Justice Ginsburg was
vague in explaining just how far-reaching Congress's authority under the Copyright
Clause is, implying that Congress reserves the right to remove works from the
public domain for any reason. As mentioned above, in various parts of the opinion,
Ginsburg points to the wide latitude Congress is permitted. For example, when
" See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 240-42 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court
concluded that Congress had a rational basis for extending existing copyrights--doing so would create
incentives for publishing and distributing these works in new forms and through new media. Id. at 207
(majority opinion). In view of the digital environment, the Court might be right. A contrary argument is
that the Court's stated goal could be accomplished by others who take such works once they enter the
public domain, allowing these works to enter digital markets perhaps more easily than by providing
increased protection.
3 See id. at 240-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 See id.
236 See Eldred, 537 U.S at 209-10. The Act provided for restoration for works that fell into the
public domain for (1) failure to comply with U.S. formalities (e.g., notice), (2) lack of federal protection
of a particular subject matter, i.e., sound recordings, and (3) lack of copyright relations with the country
where the work was first published. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A), (h)(6)(C)(i)-(iii) (2012).
217 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 883. These works thus can be distinguished from those works whose terms
had expired. Title 17 defines a "restored work" to include "an original work of authorship" that is "not in
the public domain in its source country through expiration of [its] term of protection." 17 U.S.C. §
104A(h)(6)(B). This provision tracks Berne's denial of protection for any work that has "fallen into the
public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection." Berne Convention,
supra note 123, art. 18(1). Neither Berne nor TRIPS require works that have fallen into the public
domain after term expiration to be restored. Berne, article 18(2) provides: "If, however, through the
expiry of the term of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain
of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew." Berne Convention,
supra note 123, art. 18(2). TRIPS provides: "There shall be no obligation to restore protection to subject
matter which on the date of application of this Agreement for the Member in question has fallen into
the public domain." TRIPS, supra note 133, art. 70(3). Of course, TRIPS also incorporates Berne, so
the retroactivity provision for certain works falling into the public domain still applies. TRIPS, supra
note 133, art. 9(1).
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accepting international concerns as a justification for enacting the legislation,
Ginsburg remarked that "[g]iven the authority we hold Congress has, we will not
second-guess the political choice Congress made."238 Later, Ginsburg remarked
that "the Clause 'empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes
that . . . will serve the ends of the Clause.'" 39 And, in concluding that the
legislation was a rational exercise of congressional authority, Ginsburg again made
dear the deference afforded to Congress: "[w]e have no warrant to reject the
rational judgment Congress made."'
The Court's extreme deference is problematic. In deferring to Congress, the Court
failed to fully appreciate that copyright terms that are not expressly infinite can also evade
the "limited Times" prescription. More troubling than either the Court's deference or
the Court's narrow ruling, the Court provides no guideline to evaluate whether future
terms are beyond the "limited Times" constraint. Prior to Eldred, scholars implored the
Court to provide some direction to Congress in delineating the contours of Congress's
copyright powers. 24' The Eldred Court failed to do so. Despite additional prodding, the
Court again failed to do so in Golan. This has disturbing consequences, because history
has demonstrated that Congress has little compunction in not continuing its march
toward increased, even perpetual protection.242 Indeed, in view of the Court's extreme
deference, Congress has little reason not to.243
23 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887.
" Id. at 888 (citing discussion of the Progress Clause found in Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186, 222).
240 1d. at 889.
211 See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 12, at 338-39 (optimistically hoping that the Court would use Eldred to
construe the Progress Clause "because Congress needs assistance with this important area of legislation"); see
also Solum, supra note 65, at 30-31 (arguing that "limited" cannot be defined unless placed in context). As
Professor Solum reasonably argues, that context should be in terms of what the Framers believed, which
would be "in the context of the time that individual human beings spend as authors-that is, limited with
respect to a period that only very, very rarely would exceed seventy years." Id.
242 As Justice Breyer cautioned, however, Congress might not be the only actor seeking everlasting
protection. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I am not certain why the Court considers it
relevant in this respect that '[n]othing ... warrants construction of the [1998 Act's] 20 - year term
extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the "limited Times" constraint.'" (alterations in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting the majority opinion)). Of course Congress did not intend to act
unconstitutionally. But it may have sought to test the Constitution's limits. After all, the statute was
named after a Member of Congress who, the legislative history shows, 'wanted the term of copyright
protection to last forever." See 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono); see also Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.IR
989 et al. Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Judiciary Comm., 104th
Cong. 93-94 (1995) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono) (questioning why
copyrights should ever expire); id. at 94 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) ("I guess we could... just
make a permanent moratorium on the expiration of copyrights."); id. at 230 (statement of Rep. Martin
Hoke) ("Why 70 years? Why not forever? Why not 150 years?"); id. (statement of the Register of
Copyrights Marybeth Peters) (stating that during Copyright Office proceedings, "[tihe Songwriters
Guild suggested a perpetual term"); id. at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) ("I'm particularly fascinated
with Representative Hoke's statement. . . . [W]hy not forever?"); id. at 277 (statement of Quincy Jones)
(If we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good start").
243 See Pollack, supra note 12, at 339 ('Congress has abandoned earlier caution. The first Congress
stepped gingerly into this area, but more recent sessions of Congress have enacted drastic changes with
relative rapidity and little empirical study." (citations omitted)).
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IV. A NEW APPROACH TO EVALUATE COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
A. Looking Beyond Rational Basis Review
In this part, I propose a different framework for evaluating future copyright
legislation. The real question, of course, is what should be the appropriate amount
of judicial deference the Court should afford Congress? By now, the three
predominant standards of constitutional judicial review are familiar: strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis. 244 The least deferential standard, strict
scrutiny, requires narrow tailoring to achieve a compelling government purpose.
245
The Court applies this standard when reviewing legislation that significantly
abridges a fundamental right,2" or that involves a suspect classification such as
race, national origin or religion.
247
A slightly more deferential standard, intermediate scrutiny requires that
Congress demonstrate that the regulation at issue both serves a significant
governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information. 248 This standard might alternatively demand a
substantial government interest that is directly advanced by the challenged
limitation, and the limitation may not be more extensive than necessary to serve the
asserted substantial government interest.2 49 The Court applies intermediate
scrutiny to constitutional challenges of equal protection based on gender and sex
244 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Political questions, where "the Court defers entirely to Congress," might also be considered a standard
of judicial review. See Solum, supra note 65, at 63.
245 Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1781 n.2 (1996); see Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 n.10 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24 The Court has, for example, found that interference with the right to marry and interference
with interstate migration require strict scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (establishing that the right to marry is fundamental); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978) (applying strict scrutiny to the abridgement of the fundamental right to marry); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (quoting United States v. Guest 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966)) (applying strict scrutiny to legislation interfering with interstate migration); Shahin A. Talesh,
Welfare Migration to Capture Higher Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 675,676 (2000).
247 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91. A suspect class includes a class that has experienced a history of
discrimination, is definable as a group based on obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics, is
a minority or politically powerless, and has characteristics that have little relationship to the
government's policy aims or the ability of the group's members to contribute to society. See id. at 361
(majority opinion), 438 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other suspect classes
might, according to the Court, include alienage, age, and wealth. See id. at 290 (majority opinion).
248 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455-56 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also
Gregory Russel Mier, Madsen v. Women's Health Center: Another Battle in the Endless War Over
Abortion, 40 LoY. L. REV. 979,992 (1995).
249 See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36
Loy. LA. L. REV. 123, 131-35 (2002). Professor Richard Epstein argues that this is the appropriate
standard for review, based on the language of the Copyright Clause, which sets forth both the means
and the ends of promoting the progress of science. Id.
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discrimination, 250 as well as to First Amendment challenges to content-neutral
regulations. 25' Finally, rational basis is the Court's default level of scrutiny, which
applies when neither a suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class is involved, nor a
fundamental right implicated. 252 Because the Court has done very little to define
the scope of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause, we must extrapolate
from the Court's thinking in Eldred and Golan and the Court's thinking about
other constitutional powers.
In Eldred, the Court intimated the unlikelihood of straying outside Congress's
Article I powers to define copyright limitations.2 53 The petitioners there offered the
'congruence and proportionality" standard found in Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 power.254 To withstand constitutional scrutiny under that
standard, "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."255 As applied to the
Copyright Clause, petitioners argued that any term extension must be congruent
and proportional to the goal of "promoting the Progress of Science." 56 The Court
rejected petitioners' effort to import into copyright jurisprudence this congruence
and proportionality standard. 257 The Court noted that it "[had] never applied that
standard outside the § 5 context" and distinguished Section 5 authorization from
copyright law authorization arising from Article I on the ground that "Section 5
authorizes Congress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment" while the Copyright Clause 'empowers Congress to
define the scope of the substantive right."258 The Court also rejected a heightened
First Amendment scrutiny standard, believing that copyright's prohibition on
protecting ideas and the fair use defense provided ample room for expressive
250 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
251 See, e.g., Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 448-49 (majority opinion), 455-56 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
2"2 See Sarah Finnane Hanafin, Note, Legal Shelter: A Case for Homelessness as a Protected Status
Under Hate Crime Law and Enhanced Equal Protection Scrutiny, 40 STETSON L. REV. 435, 436 n.8
(2011) (describing rational basis as the "default level" of review); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759 (2011) ("Historically, rational basis review has operated as a
residual category-that is, if a classification does not receive heightened scrutiny, it receives rational
basis review.").
151 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217-18 (2003). Thus, Professor Pollack's worthy
suggestion to look to those constitutional amendments granting Congress power to enforce the
amendments "by all Appropriate Legislation" (i.e., the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments) would also be unavailing
to the Court. See Pollack, supra note 12, at 350 & n.55.
254 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217-18 (citing City of Boerne v. Fores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
... City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
256 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217-18.2
s
7 See id. at 218.258id.
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conduct. 259 The Court's rejection of these non-Article I standards counsel
confining ourselves to Article I.
Perhaps the most natural Article I analogue is the Commerce Clause. Of
Congress's constitutional powers, this Clause has received the most attention and is
the most well-defined, albeit over a very long period of vacillating jurisprudence. It
is noteworthy that Congress has relied on the Commerce Clause to pass other
copyright-like legislation. 26° Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has expansive
powers and broad authority to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce.
261
The Court is most deferential when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause
power. The leading case on Congress's Commerce Clause powers is United States v.
Lopez.262 Under Lopez, the Court applies a rational basis standard of review. Under
this standard, the Court will uphold Congress's exercise of regulatory authority so
long as there is a rational basis for believing that the activity has a substantial effect
259 Id. at 218-20.
260 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2007). Both the Martignon and Moghadam holdings
suggested a dangerous precedent in legislative power: using the Commerce Clause (and other
constitutional provisions) to grant copyright-like protection not otherwise allowable under the
Copyright Clause. Through "creative citation[sl," namely finding the Copyright Clause to be merely
affirmative and not restrictive, the Court opened the proverbial floodgates to copyright protection
without bounds. See The Harvard Law Review Association, Constitutional La'--Coyright Clause-
Second Circuit Upholds Perpetual Anti-Bootlegging Protection Against Copyright Clause Challenge-United
States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REv. 1455, 1462 (2008). Especially
troubling is the use of the Commerce Clause to circumvent the "limited Times" provision. Using solely a
Commerce Clause analysis unlimited by the Copyright Clause, future courts could conceivably extend
protection terms indefinitely given that the protected subject matter had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (describing the current requirements for applicability of the
Commerce Clause). In Martignon, the Second Circuit held that Congress "exceeds its power under the
Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause only when (1) the law it enacts
is an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates
one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause." Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149. The limiting "test"
suggested in Martignon does very little to protect against such legislative power, which would
'undermine the Constitution's very charge to promote the progress of the usefil arts and sciences." See
Yavar Bathaee, Note, A Constitutional Idea-Expression Doctrine: Quali~ng Congress' Commerce Pover
When Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 441,512
(2008). Under the Moghadam proviso that the text of Copyright Clause is not inherently limiting, courts
could easily find that legislation fell outside the scope of its powers, thus passing the Martignon test and
becoming eligible for a Commerce Clause analysis.
261 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-59 (1995); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573 (2012) (describing Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause as
"expansive"). This precedent shows it is well established that Congress has broad authority under the
Commerce Clause.
162 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-59.
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on interstate commerce. 26 3 Although it is less than dear, in both Eldred and Golan,
the Court appears to rely on this standard. 2'
The Court's use of rational basis stands on solid ground. Both the Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause regulate economic activity.2 5 Moreover, as both
are Article I powers, 266 Congress should have wide discretion, and the rationality
supporting Congress's discretionary acts will be low. Applying a rational basis
standard with respect to the CTEA and Section 104A, the Court's deference to
Congress's judgment seems appropriate.
While the use of rational basis review is not unfounded, features of the
Copyright Clause warrant a different standard. 6 7 As more fully developed below,
263 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616. In Sebelius, the Court added gloss to this standard by holding
that there must be pre-existing economic activity to which the regulation applies. See id. at 2586.
Congress cannot order the activity for the purpose of regulating it. See id. ( 'he power to regulate
commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.").
6 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012) ("Considered against this backdrop, § 514 falls
comfortably within Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause. Congress rationally could have
concluded that adherence to Berne 'promotes the diffusion of knowledge.'" (citation omitted)); id.
("Congress determined that exemplary adherence to Berne would serve the objectives of the Copyright
Clause. We have no warrant to reject the rational judgment Congress made."); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213
( 'he justifications we earlier set out for Congress' enactment of the CTEA ... provide a rational basis
for the conclusion that the CTEA 'promote[s] the Progress of Science.'"); id. at 204 ("Satisfied that the
CTEA complies with the 'limited Times' prescription, we turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of
the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we defer substantially to
Congress."). The Court's statements concerning Congress's lack of stealthy design is odd, though. The
Court intimates that one would have to show purposeful conduct on the part of Congress to evade the
limited Times' limitation. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. This, however, looks
less like rational review and more like the Equal Protection race discrimination line of cases that started
with Washington v. Davis, in which the Court held that disproportionate effect alone is not enough to
sustain a claim of race discrimination and that proof of purposeful discrimination is the sine qua non of
race discrimination under the Constitution. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
While the legislative history of the acts at issue in Eldred and Golan provides some examples of
congressional intent by mentioning the interests benefitted from the legislation (Disney and other major
publishers and producers of works set to expire) and statements that Congress should look for ways to
protect works in perpetuity without saying so (e.g., "forever less a day"), none of the evidence would be
the smoking gun sufficient for a finding of purposeful intent to evade the limited Times' limitation. See
supra Part III.C. Even conceding that the Court applied a rational basis test, one might question
whether the approach might more accurately be described as employing a "toothless" rational basis
standard, or one that does not look too hard at the statute's rationality. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 12,
at 377 (describing the government's rational basis approach as "toothless").
265 Copyright regulates activity related to the creation and dissemination of creative works, which
involve the ability of copyright holders to economically exploit their works. See U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)
(listing categories of works subject to copyright protection, including motion pictures and sound
recordings). The Commerce Clause, by definition, relates to commercial activity and the power to
regulate commerce between states. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-53.
26 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, c. 3, 8.
267 This idea is touched on by Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion, though Justice Breyer did not
reject a rational basis review. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, he thought rational
basis might differ depending on the circumstances: "what may count as rational where economic
regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression-in a Nation
constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture." Id.
Justice Breyer thus proposed a slightly more exacting rational basis test: "I would find that the statute
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unlike the Commerce Clause, the Copyright Clause does not relate to purely
commercial conduct. Among other things, copyright also regulates expression.
268
Legislation regulating more than mere economic activity should be subject to a
more exacting inquiry. Also, unlike the Commerce Clause-or any other Article I
power-the Copyright Clause is unique as it is the only clause that "describes both
the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it."269 The Clause
grants the power to pursue a goal ("promote the Progress of Science . . . "), and
limits that power by specifying the precise means to be employed ("by securing for
limited Times to Authors . .. exclusive Right[s] . . .").270 Failing to recognize this
uniqueness reads a significant distinction out of the Constitution.2
71
Moreover, in most cases, imprudent congressional action sanctioned by the
Court's rational basis deference can be remedied by the democratic process. 2
72
There should be uneasiness however, when that democratic process has been
highjacked through industry capture, as arguably has been done by the copyright
industry. For at least these reasons, something more than rational basis review is
required.
B. Enter the Dormant Commerce Clause
If not rational basis, then what? An unthought-of but potentially useful
alternative is to reason from the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 273 The dormant Commerce Clause, which goes as far back as Chief
Justice Marshall, is the notion that the Commerce Clause not only grants power to
Congress, but also restricts the capacity of states to interfere with or burden
lacks the constitutionally necessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are
private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the Copyright
Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective." Id. at
245.
268 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Copyright does not protect ideas, but only the expression of
ideas. Id. § 102(b); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1880).
269 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Lawrence Lessig, Copyrigbt's First
Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1057,1062 (2001).
27o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
271 See Pollack, supra note 12, at 379 ("In short, the choice of this odd textual format signals a much
deeper original suspicion of legislative action pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, than of
legislative action taken under other congressional powers.").
272 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[T]he
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes.").
273 As the Court recently explained: "[t]he Commerce Clause provides that 'Congress shall have
Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.' U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although the Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate
commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority,
even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute." United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (citing In re Case of the State Freight Tax, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279 (1873); Cooley v. Bd. ofWardens, 153 U.S. (12 How.) 299,318 (1852)).
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interstate economic actors.27 Two theoretical justifications support the dormant
Commerce Clause. The first is an economic efficiency rationale: the dormant
Commerce Clause "ensures free trade among the states and thereby secures the
associated economic benefits." 275 A second justification is that it protects out-of-
state actors who lack a political voice but are nevertheless burdened by the state's
regulation.
2 76
The Court has devised two dormant Commerce Clause tests to ensure that
states do not burden interstate commerce. One includes a virtual per se prohibition
against overt state discrimination against out-of-state economic interests (with a
few exceptions).277 "If a state's law discriminates against out-of-state [persons], [the
law] is subject to 'the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose
and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives. 278 This test is rarely
satisfied.27 9 The second test is a balancing test for laws that are formally neutral
274 The "dormant" nature of the Commerce Clause reflects the notion that "the Commerce Clause
is always awake, even when Congress is asleep." MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN
CONSTIfUTION 92 (2012) (citing BORIS I. BITrKER, BrKER ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 6-4 n.5 (1999)).
275 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785, 795 (2001). This might also be thought of as preventing state protectionism. As
.Goldsmith and Sykes note:
Economic theory holds that when a jurisdiction undertakes to insulate its producers from
competition through restrictions on the importation of goods and services, overall economic
welfare declines as the losses to in-state consumers and out-of-state producers exceed the
gains to the protected in-state producers. Protectionist policies nevertheless may be politically
attractive in many cases because the beneficiaries are often well-organized groups of in-state
firms. As mentioned above, the central purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to
prevent such protectionism, and the primary judicial tool for effectuating this purpose is a
prohibition on state regulations that discriminate against out-of-state actors.
Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
276 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 361; Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 337-38 (2008); McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719-20 (2013); Goldsmith &_ Sykes, supra
note 275, at 795. Additionally, as Goldsmith and Sykes note:
A secondary justification for the dormant Commerce Clause is that it protects out-of-state
actors who are burdened by a state's regulation but lack a voice in the political process that
generates it. The difficulty with the process justification, however, is that it sweeps too
broadly. Innumerable state laws affect outsiders, and no one thinks that all (or even most) of
these laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause. What is needed is a way to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate out-of-state effects. Our economic perspective does just this Iy
distinguishing between state regulations that enhance overall economic welfare despite their
extraterritorial effects and state regulations that lower overall economic welfare. In this
manner, we unify the efficiency and process justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause
in a way that is consistent with much of the pertinent case law. The economic perspective
also allows us to bring some theoretical coherence to the otherwise undertheorized notions of
extraterritoriality and inconsistency that play an important role in the Internet cases.
Id. at 795-96 (citations omitted).
277 See id. at 788 (citations omitted).
271 Id. (citations omitted).
279 id.
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with respect to out-of-state actors, but that cast disproportionate burdens on
interstate (as opposed to intrastate) commercial activity.280 Stated differently,
"[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is dearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."2 81 The test is a proportionality or balancing test, which
measures the extent of the disproportionate burden on out-of-state actors against
the putative benefits to legitimate state governmental interests. This test was first
articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
282
In Pike, the Court ruled that an order prohibiting a cantaloupe grower from
transporting uncrated cantaloupes from Arizona to California for packing and
processing constituted an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. 283 The
statute at issue, the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act, required all
Arizona grown cantaloupes to "be packaged in regular compact arrangement in
dosed standard containers." 284 Because Bruce Church, which had commercial
farming operations in Arizona and California, transported cantaloupes grown in
Arizona to California for processing and packaging, the statute required Bruce
Church to build packing facilities in Arizona; the facilities would cost
approximately $200,000.285 The state official in charge of enforcing the statute
argued that the statute did not impose a burden upon interstate commerce, but
rather would merely regulate intrastate packing of goods destined for interstate
commerce.
286
The Court rejected this reasoning. It held that the statute affected interstate
commerce because it required operations previously performed in California to be
performed in Arizona.287 And, though the Court found that the statute was even-
handed, the burden imposed on commerce was clearly excessive to any local
interest. 8 8 In particular, while the state was pursuing a legitimate interest, i.e.,
protecting and enhancing the reputation of growers within the state, 289 these
interests were dearly outweighed by the burden imposed on Bruce Church.290 In
addition to the considerable expense of building an Arizona packing plant, the
280 
Id.
28" Id. at 788-89 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970)).
282 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
283 See id. at 146.
" See id. at 138 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-503(C) (repealed effective 1994)).
285 Id. at 140.
28 Id. at 140 (according to Pike, "[a]rtides being made ready for interstate movement are not
necessarily yet in interstate commerce...
28 See id. at 146.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 143.
290 See id. at 145. After deciding that a legitimate interest was involved, the Court looked to the
burden imposed on interstate commerce. See id. at 142 ("If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.").
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Court viewed the statute with skepticism, as it required Bruce Church to perform
its business operations in Arizona when it could have performed its operations
more efficiently in California.
291
The Pike test has appeal as a constitutional principle for thinking about the
limits on copyright protection.292 Unlike the Commerce Clause power to regulate,
which Congress can exercise in any direction (i.e., increase commerce, reduce
commerce, eliminate commerce), both the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Copyright Clause are unidirectional: Congress can only "promote Progress" under
the Copyright Clause, and under the dormant Commerce Clause states can only
legislate to encourage interstate commerce, and are forbidden from burdening
it.293 In that sense, copyright is more similar to the dormant Commerce Clause
than to the general commerce power of Congress.
The dormant Commerce Clause and copyright legislation also share underlying
concerns of interference with the democratic process and uneven participation.
Absent the dormant Commerce Clause, states remain free to regulate when
Congress has not spoken. This allows for decentralized regulation, which has many
benefits. 294 Specifically, "lower levels of government are better able to ascertain and
implement the best regulatory policy for the local citizenry than the central
government."295 This is understandable. Variations exist with regard to state
citizens' cultural and religious backgrounds, and the costs and benefits of regulation
often vary from state to state, justifying state autonomy.296
Decentralized regulation, however, has negative effects. Relevant here is the
hijacking of the political process. Goldsmith and Sykes make this point:
[Tihe political process in any jurisdiction may fail to pursue policies that are in
the best interests of its citizens as a whole. Individuals and other entities with
large stakes in a policy outcome will organize to influence it; those with smaller
stakes often will not bother. Policies that are on balance undesirable may thus be
enacted if the costs are diffsed widely enough that resistance is ineffective.
297
This, too, describes copyright legislation. Elsewhere, I have recounted the
history of recent copyright legislation and how copyright holders and content
providers have heavily influenced the political process; indeed, industry capture and
public choice theory accounts for the spectacular expansion of copyright law
291 Id. at 145.
292 Admittedly, much of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved
discriminatory and protectionist state legislation. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 275, at 797-98.
293 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 8; GREVE, supra note 274, at 93 ("The affirmative commerce
power lends itself to a pro- or anticompetitive purposes: Congress may break monopolies or make them,
liberate interstate commerce or restrict it, regulate commerce or balkanize it. The judicially enforced
dormant Commerce Clause, in contrast, cuts in only one direction; regardless of its precise formulation,
it mows down state-imposed obstacles to interstate commerce.").
294 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 275, at 796.
295 Id.
296 See id. at 796-97.
297 Id. at 797.
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through legislative efforts, including the ever-increasing copyright term. 298 The
short story is that the Copyright Act was produced under intense lobbying from the
copyright and content industry, with the near-complete absence of public interest
representation. It is consequently not surprising that this led to a Copyright Act
heavily slanted in favor of content providers and copyright owners, resulting in a
"maximalist ideology of copyright"299 and a systemic bias against absent interests.3°°
As the Court polices this conduct with regard to state-to-state discrimination, so
too should it do so with regard to copyright legislation.
30 1
Beyond the above similarities, both the dormant Commerce Clause and
copyright reach more than economic regulation. 30 2 The dormant Commerce
Clause, while unmistakably affecting commerce, is at the same time a federalism
doctrine,30 3 an anti-circumvention rule,304 a state protectionist doctrine, 30 5 and an
extraterritoriality principle.306 It also promotes national union, i.e., political and
economic integration.307 Copyright's reach is vast. While principally regarded as
" See Donald P. Harris, The New Prohibition: A Look at the Copyright Wars Through the Lens of
Alcohol Prohibition, 80 TENN. L. REV. 101, 102, 131-35 (2012). There, I argue:
The legislative changes to the Copyright Act fit nicely with public choice theory. Public
choice is the economic theory of interest group politics. The theory addresses the dynamic
tension between 'rent-seeking' behavior of interest groups, who lobby government for special
moneymaking privileges, and the desires of ordinary voters. The former fund campaigns,
while the latter vote in them. To a large degree, politicians are beholden to both, but often
must play them off against each other. Lobbyists succeed best when their interests can be
protected by laws that might not be beneficial to the public, but are not so directly harmful
that they motivate the public to vote against the politicians whose votes for protective
legislation the lobbyists secure. As regards the copyright laws, the lobbyists were able to
secure the legal protection they desired from the legislatures (in exchange for campaign
money) but consumers were unlikely to vote against the legislators on this ground. From the
legislator's selfish short-term perspective, the best of all possible worlds is to have strong
theoretical laws on the books, that keep getting stronger (hence drawing continuing interest
group support), but to have the enforcement of those laws remain sporadic and isolated, so
that consumers/voters do not react against the laws by organizing against them.
Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
299 Id. at 102.
300 See id. at 131-34.
" See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 907 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen a
copyright law is primarily backward looking the risk is greater that Congress is trying to help known
beneficiaries at the expense of badly organized unknown users who find it difficult to argue and present
their case to Congress. In Eldred, I thought this problem was severe .... I cannot say that even here the
problem, while much diminished, was nonexistent." (citations omitted)).
302 That is evident from the separate Clause given to patent and copyright protection within Article
I, Section 8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8. Had the Framers envisioned author and inventor rights as
mere economic rights, they might easily have authorized Congress to pass such laws under their
Commerce Clause powers. They did not choose to do so. See id, cl. 3; id., cl. 8.
303 GREVE, supra note 274, at 93.
304 See id. at 95.
" Goldsmith &_ Sykes, supra note 275, at 788.
3o6 Id. at 788-89.
0 GREVE, supra note 274, at 111. According to Goldsmith and Sykes, the Court has defined the
scope of this extraterritoriality principle as "predud[ing] the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
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affecting commerce, free speech, and expression,3"' it also shapes diffusion of
culture, knowledge, and distributive justice,309 to name but a few. The similarities
between the purposes and principles underlying the dormant Commerce Clause
and copyright legislation, and their similar reach into areas beyond commerce, thus
provide an adequate foundation for applying the Pike balancing test to copyright
legislation, including the CTEA and the Berne Implementation Act.
C. Applying the Pike Balancing Test to Copyright
Under Pike, the initial inquiry is whether either the CTEA or the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Section 104A discriminate on their face. If so, they are
"virtually per se invalid."3 0 Neither of the acts do so. Neither act provides for a
facially perpetual copyright grant, nor do either unambiguously fail to "promote
Progress" or discriminate against the public or users of works. 311 In evaluating this,
more is required than that both acts affect the promotion of "Progress." Both
dearly do. Indeed, how they do so is complicated, because the potential for
promotion lies on both sides of the balance. Sometimes, securing copyright will
"promote Progress"; sometimes, limiting or prohibiting copyright will "promote
Progress." But neither act dearly and unambiguously fails to "promote Progress."
Moreover, admittedly in the first instance, the line drawing unquestionably
belongs to Congress. Here, however, is where the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis differs from current analysis. Rather than blindly relying on any proffered
rationale Congress provides, under Pike, the Court must not only require some
plausible explanation as to how a particular extension of copyright ownership will
advance rather than retard the "Progress of Science," but the balancing test requires
closer judicial scrutiny of Congress's proffered rationale.312 And, unlike the current
test, which requires either a facially perpetual copyright or some explicit evidence of
a congressional design to provide a perpetual copyright,3 3 the Pike balancing test
can capture a functionally perpetual term. This is where the second prong of the
test becomes important.
the State." Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 275, at 789-90 (emphasis removed) (citing Healy v. Beer
Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
" See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat may count as
rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression-
in a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and
culture.").
' See, e.g., Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 121 (2014).
0 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). To be more precise,
legislation that facially discriminates is subject to the strictest scrutiny. See id. In practice, such
legislation rarely, if ever, survives strict scrutiny.
311 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat 4809, 4976-4981
(1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)); see generally Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.).
312 See supra Part IV.B.
313 See supra Part III.D.
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The second prong requires analyzing whether the legislation imposes a
disproportionate burden on users that outweighs any benefits to copyright
holders.314 Copyright has always been seen as a balance of interests, balancing the
interests of artists and creators against those of the public's access to a broad and
varied array of literature, music, and other creative works of art.315 This, then, is a
particularly appropriate test that recognizes and incorporates this balance in
analyzing congressional copyright action. 316 A rational basis test fails to accomplish
this.317 Applying this prong to both the CTEA and the Section 104A produces,
perhaps, different outcomes.
The CTEA fails the test, as it benefits private interests without regard to public
benefits. The additional twenty year protection-the "longest blanket extension
since the Nation's founding"31'-might provide some incentive to artists to create,
but this incentive is minimal. Not only could artists not be guaranteed any later
extension, but the economic value of the additional twenty years becomes relatively
insignificant. Citing an amicus brief written by five Nobel prize-winning
economists, Justice Breyer's dissent in Eldred explains how the present value of
revenue over a hundred years would mean pennies currently.319 This analysis
generally presumes a constant revenue stream and also accounts for the fact that
less than two percent of works enjoy the type of success that enables long-term
revenue. 3'° These economists also concluded that the protection under the CTEA
314 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 275, at 802-03. As Goldsmith and Sykes explain:
To recast this point in the language of balancing, we can say that the benefits to the
regulating jurisdiction and its citizens exceed the losses to those outside the jurisdiction; that
is, the regulatory benefits exceed the burden on commerce. Whenever regulatory policy
corrects for external harms in a precisely optimal fashion, economic welfare will rise; the gains
to those who benefit then exceed the losses to those who suffer. If all state regulation of
external harms embodied the ideal corrective response, therefore, there would be no role for
balancing analysis because the outcome of such analysis would always favor the regulation in
question. But for various reasons, including limited information and defects in the political
process, states may not impose the ideal corrective for extemal harm.
Id
sI See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 901-03 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the
historical consideration in copyright legislation of balancing the interests of the copyright holder and the
public).
311 See id. at 900 ("Consequently, the original British copyright statute, the Constitution's Framers,
and our case law all have recognized copyright's resulting and necessary call for balance.").317 Justice Breyer was on the right track, but stopped short. Under a more deferential standard than
that proposed here-his modified rational basis standard-he would have found the statute
unconstitutional. See id. at 900, 907-08, 912. Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer appreciated that
copyright is more than economic regulation, as it also affects freedom of expression. See id. at 907-08,
912. He would collapse the First Amendment and Copyright Clause analysis and instead apply a
heightened rational basis standard. See id. at 912.
"' See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
319 See id. at 254-55 (citing Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 5-7, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618)).
31 Only two percent of works retain their commercial value beyond 55 years. See id. at 248 (based
on figures provided in RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 4-5). Of course, whether the time is "limited"
2015-2016]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
term was worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity. 321 Moreover, the EU
Copyright Term Directive does not justify the extension. As shown above, the
Directive is not an international obligation, and thus compliance was not required
under any treaty or international agreement. 2 On the other hand, the harm to
users is significant. The CTEA keeps out of the public domain a significant
number of works and keeps the prices for these works artificially high.323 This not
only restricts distribution of these works, but also inhibits the ability of potential
users to either access the works or make them accessible to others. 3' The combined
economic impact and the impact on expressive conduct outweighs the singular
focus on benefiting copyright owners.
depends upon how one defines that term. "Limited" is relative. The Court has interpreted "limited
Times" in reference to a perpetual copyright. With that frame of reference, it is difficult to envision any
term other than a perpetual copyright would be found unlimited. See supra note 32. The Court had
other options. Indeed, a better reference might be that of no protection. The framers enacted copyright
legislation in the face of monopolistic abuses in England. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1144-46 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and
Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J.
2331, 2363-64 (2003). It is not unreasonable to expect that limited monopolies were tolerated only
because they had to be. As Justice Breyer notes in his Golan dissent: 'Thomas Jefferson, for example,
initially expressed great uncertainty as to whether the Constitution should authorize the grant of
copyrights and patents at all, writing that 'the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful' to
warrant anything other than their 'suppression.'" Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 440, 443 (J. Boyd ed. 1956)). Another plausible reference is that of the average lifespan of
persons in 1790, when Congress enacted the first copyright act. Professor Solum reasons that "limited"
must be placed in context, and argues that that context should be in terms of what the Framers believed,
which would be "the time that individual human beings spend as authors-that is, limited with respect
to a period that only very, very rarely would exceed seventy years." Solum, supra note 65, at 30-33. As
Professor Solum states,
the 'limited T'imes" in the Clause must be construed as limited in context. In this case, as in
so many others, there is no bright line that divides a limited term from one that is not
limited. Given the facts of human life and the early historical practice, twenty-eight, forty-
two or even fifty-six years can reasonably be viewed as long but limited terms. Given these
same facts and dues to original understandings, life plus fifty years or life plus seventy years
cannot be viewed as limited. Although no precise line divides that which is constitutionally
permissible from that which is forbidden, this should not be viewed as an obstacle to judicial
enforcement in cases in which Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. Rather,
terms that are not limited in the context of exclusive rights granted to authors ought to be
struck down. In this way, the abstract and acontextual reading of "limited Times" can be
avoided, and with it, the consequence that Congress might, consistent with the language of
the Clause, confer a practically infinite but abstractly limited copyright term of 500 years or
even much longer.
Id. at 33 (citations omitted). Viewed from either of these references, a changing perception emerges
with regard to the suitability of copyright term of life plus seventy years. Put more simply, the term
looks significantly different from either of these perspectives than it does from that of a perpetual term.
... Eldred, 537 U.S. at 255-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing this based on figures provided in
RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 7).
322 See supra Part IIA.
s3 See Eldred, 537 S. Ct. at 248-49.
324 Id.
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Section 104A presents a closer question. The interests at stake under Section
104A differ from those of the CTEA. Section 104A's benefit to copyright owners
is significant. Rather than having no protection, copyright holders obtained
original protection for the remainder of the copyright term. 2 5 In addition,
although the claim of "exemplary adherence to Berne" is generous and
dissemination of foreign works abroad likely lies beyond the relevant interests
contemplated by the Framers, it is nonetheless true that under either Berne or
TRIPS restoration of works falling into the public domain is an international
obligation and failure to do so might have threatened the United States' prominent
position with respect to international intellectual property.326 The Act is also less
questionable than the CTEA in terms of ulterior motives, as it protects foreign
interests as opposed to the domestic interests at stake with respect to the CTEA.
327
The impact on the public is also significant. 328 Unlike in Eldred, where the public's
interest involved the anticipation of works falling into the public domain, 329 in
Golan the parties relied on works already in the public domain, and had already
began utilizing the works.330 Having these parties either stop using the works or
requiring them to now pay for such works imposes considerable harm. Section
104A attempts to ameliorate or lessen this harm by allowing "reliance parties" to
continue using the work so long as they pay to the copyright holder reasonable
remuneration. 331 Providing protection to works in the public domain also arguably
moves us closer to a perpetual copyright. 332 While this is a dose call, the fact that
copyright holders were denied protection at all in the first place coupled with the
international concerns, plausibly tilts the balance in favor of copyright holders and
thus points to the constitutionality of Section 104A.
D. Response to Possible Criticisms
Adopting the dormant Commerce Clause analytical framework has its
problems. As a preliminary matter, though, we can put to one side concerns of
supplanting the Court's current standard, whatever that may be. The Court's
application of a particular standard does not preclude the Court from later applying
a different standard it deems more appropriate. The Court's history regarding sex
discrimination is instructive on this point. In Reed v. Reed, the Court applied
rational basis scrutiny to sex discrimination. 3 3 Two years later, in Frontiero v.
125 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012).
326 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878-80 (2012).
327 See id. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Wlhen a copyright law is primarily backward looking the
risk is greater that Congress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense of badly organized
unknown users who find it difficult to argue and present their case to Congress.").
121 See id. at 900.
329 See Eldred, 537 S. Ct. at 195-96.
330 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
331 See id. at 883 (majority opinion) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)).
332 See supra Part III.D.
333 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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Richardson, the Court changed course and applied strict scrutiny.33 4 Then, three
years after that, the Court yet again changed course in Craig v. Boren and applied
the current intermediate scrutiny standard. 33' There are numerous other examples
of such changes.
3 36
Neither should the fact that the dormant Commerce Clause is to some degree
controversial pose a problem. Justice Thomas opposes all dormant Commerce
Clause reasoning because he believes the doctrine "has no basis in the Constitution
and has proved unworkable in practice."3 37 Justice Thomas fundamentally believes
that the Court has no business policing state commercial regulation. 331 Justice
Scalia is only slightly less hostile to the dormant Commerce Clause. While he
asserts that neither history nor text "provideU grounds for reading the Commerce
Clause to be other than what it says-an authorization for Congress to regulate
commerce,"339 he nevertheless enforces the dormant Commerce Clause-on stare
decisis grounds-in two situations: "'(1) against a state law that facially
discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is
indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by the
Court."3 ' ° Despite Justices Thomas's and Scalia's (and others') spurn of the
dormant Commerce Clause, 341 the dormant Commerce Clause has an
" See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
... Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also id at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court's opinion in the case elevated the standard of scrutiny under which the statute was
analyzed).
116 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state affirmative
action measure, which the Court a year later in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC changed to intermediate
scrutiny. See City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989); Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990). The Court reasoned that the federal government had more flexibility and that
considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment and race allow the federal government to be more
restrictive than states. See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 605-06 (citing J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at
522). In addition, the Court changed course from the strict scrutiny restrictions on married couples in
Grisqoold v. Connecticut to rational basis scrutiny restrictions on contraception for unmarried couples in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, and then required strict scrutiny analysis in Carey v. Popul. Servs., Int'l. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Carey v.
Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977).
117 See United Haulers Ass'n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).3 8Id.
339 See id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. St. Dep't
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
o Id. (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment)).
" See, e.g., Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MiNN. L. REv. 1764, 1765 (2004) ('Justices Scalia and Thomas stand far taller than other
critics of the dormant Commerce Clause. These Justices so despise the dormant Commerce Clause that
they no longer call it by its usual name. Instead, because the Clause 'does not appear in the
Constitution,' Justices Scalia and Thomas call it the 'negative' Commerce Clause." (citing Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) and Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)). The Justices suggest that other constitutional provisions can regulate state-to-state
discrimination. Justice Thomas proposes replacing dormant Commerce Clause analysis with an Import-
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unquestionably strong historical pedigree, having been part of constitutional
jurisprudence for almost a century and a half.312
Further, both Justices's views rest on the underlying premise that constitutional
doctrine must be a clause-bound doctrine; that is, the doctrine must have a
foundation in one or more clauses of the Constitution. 3 Because the dormant
Commerce Clause neither has such constitutional authority nor derives solely from
the Commerce Clause, it is unsound. While this premise dominates constitutional
interpretation, it is not alone. Charles Black suggests searching for constitutional
doctrine from "the structures and relationships created by the [C]onstitution." 31
Absent particular text to point to as authority, the Court can still infer doctrine
Export Clause analysis (Article I, Section 10). Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610. The
Import-Export Clause provides in relevant part: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Justice Scalia advocates for an analysis under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, Section 2. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 483 U.S. at 265. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
342 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 338 ("Although the Constitution does not in terms
limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an
implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute." (citing In re
Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279 (1873)); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299, 318 (1852))). Greve contends that the first "unambiguous" dormant Commerce Clause
case was in 1872, in In re State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts. GREVE, supra note 274, at 93 & 426 n.3
(citing In re State Tax on Ry. Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872)). Greve underscores the
importance of the doctrine, noting that "[bly 1932, the dormant Commerce Clause had felled some 180
state laws, and it would retain much of its vitality throughout and after the New Deal." Id. (citation
omitted). The doctrine continues to have significant influence in American jurisprudence today. See, e.g.,
United Hauler's Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 338.
3 See United Haulers Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id at 349 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
344 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7
(1969). Black argues that this form of constitutional interpretation and legal reasoning is undervalued
and underused, but could better explain current doctrine and, moreover, "frees us to talk sense," rather
than relying on other means of interpretation to define vague and ambiguous text such as using
dictionaries and "scanning utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who did not really face the
questions we are asking." See id. at 13, 22-23. Black does not suggest substituting structure and
relationship in place of textual interpretation. Rather, he suggests a complementary relationship, with
the inferences from structure and relationship "underl[ying] the textual manipulation" and "invoked to
support the interpretation of the cryptic text[.]" See id at 29. Black makes this symbiotic connection
clear:
I must timidly correct a doubtless nonexistent impression that what I have suggested is the
total abandonment of the method of parficular-text interpretation. It is entirely plain, on the
contrary, that so long as we continue to look on our Constitution as a part of the law
applicable in court, just so long the work of sheer textual interpretation will be a great part-
probably the greatest part-of judicial work in constitutional law. There is, moreover, a close
and perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of
reasoning, for the structure and the relations concerned are themselves created by the text,
and inference drawn from them must surely be controlled by the text.
Id. at 31. Of course, Black's mode of interpretation requires us to identify those relations and structures
that might establish a suitable basis for relying on such interpretation.
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from, for example, "the economic structure of nationhood" or the political structure
of federalism.
345
Still further, the most forceful response to opponents of the dormant
Commerce Clause is that one need not endorse the dormant Commerce Clause
itself to adopt the Court's review standard as a useful tool in thinking about and
analyzing copyright legislation. That standard, undeniably, remains part of
constitutional jurisprudence. And it is because the underlying principles that
animate the dormant Commerce Clause also undergird policing copyright
legislation, the Pike test is suitable for evaluating copyright legislation like that at
issue in Eldred and Golan, and other future copyright legislation.
The sharpest criticism of doing so is perhaps that the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause cases are limited to discriminatory and protectionist state
legislation-the Court has never applied the test outside of this specific context.346
Fair enough. But while overcoming this argument is a challenge, it is not
insurmountable.347 In fact, the same reasons that justify the doctrine in the first
place are an adequate response to this criticism. More to the point, that the
doctrine has been applied only against states should not prevent us from borrowing
from it in circumstances where Congress's power is similarly limited under the
Constitution. The doctrine applies when legislation negatively affects commerce.
Copyright legislation can negatively affect commerce. The doctrine applies to
neutralize defects in the political process. Copyright law is tainted because of
defects in the political process. The doctrine regulates more than economic
concerns. Copyright is imbued with much more than mere economic matters,
including fundamental rights of expression and speech. The doctrine provides a
flexible approach that looks beyond literal or facial discrimination to balance
competing interests. Copyright's foundation is built on balancing competing
interests. All of these make the dormant Commerce Clause analysis fitting for
considering copyright laws.
CONCLUSION
How long should copyright last? How best can we promote the public interest
in assuring access to works? These are hard questions.348 But they must be
answered. And the answer cannot be "whatever Congress says." 349
341 See id. at 20-21. Black grounds the dormant Commerce Clause on, among others, this economic
structure of nationhood (i.e., "we are one people, commercially as otherwise") rather than on any
negative implication of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 19-21.
34' See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 571 (noting that the Commerce Clause is used
as a limit on the power of the states).
17 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 275, at 797-98 (providing an argument for overcoming
this limitation of the dormant Commerce Clause in relation to federal internet regulations).
" See Gordon, supra note 215, at 6 ("Much lively debate surrounds the question of what kind of
fine-tuning copyright needs in order to ensure that social gains exceeds social loss.").
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There will be future copyright legislation, including cries for increasing the
copyright term. While some scholars have called for a reduction in the duration of
the copyright term, this seems optimistic, to put it politely.35 0 Conventional
wisdom envisages another increase in the term. Mary Bono, speaking on the floor
of the House of Representatives during the hearings on the CTEA, informed the
House that her husband, Sonny Bono, after whom the CTEA is named ("The
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act"), wanted copyrights to last forever. 35'
When informed that such a term would be unconstitutional, she pleaded with the
House to take up at the next Congress Jack Valenti's (then President of the Motion
Picture Association of America) proposal for a term of "forever less a day"352 It is
hard to seriously contend that this is a term our Framers envisioned. Moreover,
that such a term is unwise is, hopefully, self-evident.
353
But how will we evaluate it or a similarly lengthy term? Of course not every
increase in the term will offend the Constitution or violate the Copyright Clause's
"limited Times" or "promote Progress" limits. Yet a broad Eldred-like strict reading
of the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" would defeat the constitutional purpose
of promoting "Progress" and might include unfathomable terms. Insofar as the
Court's test limits second-guessing to terms other than those that are
"circumscribed," "restrained," and "confined within certain bounds," 354 the Court
licenses Congress to do indirectly what the Clause forbids them to do directly.
355
3 There is much to be said for deference to Congress, particularly in areas where the Constitution
by its express terms grants authority to Congress to regulate. But, as expressed throughout this Artide,
while Congress has a role to play, so too does the Court. See supra Part II & Part IVA.
350 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 45, at 566-67 (2007) (discussing the author's lack of optimism
and the infeasibility of copyright reform at this time); 9j. WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT
201 (2011) (proposing a potential reform); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 292-
93 (2004) (discussing ideas for improvement in the area of copyright regulation).
311 See 144 CONG. REC. H9951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono).
352 Id. at H9952.
313 See Solum, supra note 65, at 29 ("It is clear that a limited time is not an infinite one. If this were
the only constraint imposed by this phrase, it would be a trifling constraint indeed. Congress might
specify terms measured in centuries or millennia without approaching infinity. Indeed, any period or
term at all, even one that would exceed the expected life of the Sun would be limited in this sense. This
possibility motivates the search for some other constraint. Because there are finite spans of time that are
unlimited for the purposes of humans, the phrase limited times must mean something other than a
finite term if we are to attribute to the Framers some purpose in using the word 'limited.'" (citations
omitted)).
... See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003).
355 An "originalist" such as Justices Thomas or Scalia might extrapolate the answer from
information gleaned from documentary evidence of the founding generation (constitutional debates,
writings like the Federalist papers, contemporary law and practice, historical English and common law
antecedents, and the like). See Fallon, supra note 171, at 1197, 1211. There is scant legislative history
regarding the Copyright Clause. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 999 (1990). A "nonoriginalist" would, in
addition to these sources, also consider historical statutory practice since the founding, plus some sort of
functionalist reasoning about the relationship between protection and innovation, in light of current and
future realities of research, art, and publishing. See Fallon, supra note 171, at 1197-98, 1214 & n.120.
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To give force and effect to the Copyright Clause's limitations, this Article has
suggested a balancing test with more bite than the current approach. The Article
has undertaken the challenge to provide future Courts and Congress guidelines and
a limiting principle to constrain congressional action. An approach that more
straightforwardly and unambiguously balances the interests of creators and the
public and requires some real evidence supporting any conclusion is needed. And
an approach that allows us to look to the functional effect of copyright legislation
rather than to a nondiscriminatory purpose is a modest attempt at providing such a
limiting principle. We need one. Thus far, the Court has failed to provide it.
